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POVERTY, ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, AND THE 
DEBACLE OF DOHA ROUND COUNTER-TERRORISM: 
PART TWO OF A TRILOGY – 





  Parts One and Three of the Trilogy appears as follows: Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist 
Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round Counter-Terrorism: Part One of a Trilogy – 
Agricultural Tariffs and Subsidies, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. (forthcoming 2012), and Raj Bhala, 
Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round Counter-Terrorism: Part 
Three of a Trilogy – Trade Remedies and Facilitation, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y (forth-
coming 2012), part of the 40th Anniversary Symposium in Honor of Professor Ved Nanda. 
 † Associate Dean for International and Comparative Law, and Rice Distinguished Profes-
sor, The University of Kansas, School of Law, Green Hall, 1535 West 15th Street, Lawrence, 
KS 66045-7577 U.S.A.  Tel. 785-864-9224.  Fax. 785-864-5054. www.law.ku.edu. Foreign 
Legal Consultant, Heenan Blaikie, L.L.P., Canada. J.D., Harvard (1989); M.Sc., Oxford 
(1986); M.Sc., London School of Economics (1985); A.B., Duke (1984). Marshall Scholar 
(1984–86). Member, Council on Foreign Relations, Royal Society for Asian Affairs, and 
Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. For further examples of the author’s work: a monograph, 
RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (Carolina Academic Press 2003), a 
treatise, RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW (2005), a textbook, RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE (3rd ed. 2008), a reference, RAJ 
BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (2008), and a textbook, RAJ BHALA, 
UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARĪ‘A) (2011). I am grateful to my spring 2011 Advanced 
International Trade Law class for many excellent research papers, which provided many 
insights and sources incorporated into this article, including the papers by Hannah Sandal 
and Joseph R. Billings, both of the University of Kansas School of Law Class of 2011, and 
Sarah R. Schmidt, Class of 2013. This article assumes familiarity with Part One of the Trilo-
gy, and my five prior publications on the Doha Round, at least with the relevant substantive 
concepts and events that occurred between the launch of the Round in November 2001 and 
negotiations as of July 2009: 
(1) Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam, and Doha, 36 INT’L LAW. 159 (2002), which covers the 
launch of the Round in November 2001. 
(2) Chapters 3 and 4 of the textbook, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
THEORY AND PRACTICE referenced above, particularly concepts and terms in the negotia-
tions, and status of those talks through the July 2007 Draft Modalities Texts issued by 
Ambassadors Crawford Falconer (New Zealand) and Donald Stephenson (Canada), 
Chairmen of the Agriculture and Non-Agricultural Market Access negotiations, respec-
tively. Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, Revised Draft Modalities for Agricul-
ture, TN/AG/W/4 (Aug. 1, 2007). 
(3) Raj Bhala, Doha Round Schisms: Numerous, Technical, and Deep, 6 LOY. U. CHI. 
INT’L L. REV. 5 (2008), which covers the Round through the July 2008 collapsed Ministe-
rial meeting. 
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(4) Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details, Grand Themes, and China 
Too, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1 (2009), which analyzes the Round from the July 2008 collapse 
through July 2009. 
(5) Raj Bhala, Doha Round Betrayals, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 147 (2010), which consid-
ers the Round from July 2009 through December 2009. 
Portions of this article are drawn from Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish De-
tails, Grand Themes, and China Too, supra. All errors are the responsibility of the author. 
For a stimulating account of the Round set in a wide context of political economy, see Wil-
liam A. Lovett, Beyond Doha: Multipolar Challenges for a Globalized World, 17 TULANE J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 3 (2008). 
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I. SYNOPSIS 
The title of the Trilogy on the Doha Round, of which this article is 
Part Two, connotes the general argument: the Round is a failed instrument 
of counter-terrorism. The Round, launched in November 2001, was sup-
posed to make the world safe for free trade, and in doing so, give hope and a 
stake in the global trading system to hundreds of millions of poor people, 
particularly in Islamic communities, who might otherwise be vulnerable to 
pernicious, ostensibly religious, ideologies. But as the decade-long negotia-
tions of the Round progressed, commercial self-interest of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Members dwarfed their shared interest, and thus the 
common good, in fighting poverty, thereby attacking one factor related to 
the spread of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in the name (but, in 
fact, abuse) of Islam. 
Part One of the Trilogy advanced this argument in the context of 
trade liberalization in agriculture, namely, efforts to reduce agricultural tar-
iffs, discipline domestic support, and eliminate export subsidies. Part Two 
does so in the contexts of trade liberalization in industrial products, so-
called “non-agricultural market access” (NAMA) negotiations, and services 
trade. As with Part One, the context of Part Two is technical. The “devil,” in 
the sense of straying far away from the initial purpose of the Doha Round, is 
in the “details” of lengthy, mind-numbing draft modalities texts. The texts 
critically analyzed here are the December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities 
Agreement,1 the April 2011 NAMA Document,2 and April 2011 Services 
Document.3 
Part One concluded with observations on how the WTO and its 
Members artificially created a new logic for the Doha Round, namely, to 
  
 1 Negotiating Group on Market Access, Fourth Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-
Agricultural Market Access, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3 (Dec. 6, 2008) [hereinafter December 
2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text]. 
 2 Negotiating Group on Market Access, Textual Report by the Chairman, Ambassador 
Luzius Wasexcha, on the State of Play of the NAMA Negotiations, TN/MA/W/103/Rev. 
3Add.1 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 NAMA Document]; see also Trade Negotia-
tion Committee, Report by the Director-General on his Consultations on NAMA Sectoral 
Negotiations, TN/C/14 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter NAMA Report by Director-General]. 
 3 Council for Trade in Services, Negotiations on Trade in Services, TN/S/36 (Apr. 21, 
2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Services Document]. 
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fight the global economic slump, so as to justify their collective but flagging 
endeavor. Part Two concludes with observations about the role the People’s 
Republic of China has played in the Round. It proposes China has not lived 
up to its ballyhooed promise on the eve of its accession to the WTO, which 
occurred on December 11, 2001: to act with statesmanship and be a prob-
lem-solver.4 Failing to rise above the mercantilist fray, it has been a player 
along with the U.S., EU, and other significant powers. Gripped by fear of 
losing power amidst socioeconomic distress, ethnic tensions, and rising ex-
pectations about democracy and human rights, the Chinese Communist Par-
ty (CCP) has backed rules in the negotiating texts that incline more toward 
managed than free trade and have no link, or are even orthogonal, to the 
interest of the common good in counter-terrorism. These observations, like 
those of Part One, support the overall Trilogy argument that the Round is 
not about trade liberalization, poverty alleviation, or reducing threats from 
VEOs. 
II. ENHANCING INDUSTRIAL MARKET ACCESS THROUGH THE SWISS 
FORMULA 
“NAMA” is WTO-speak for all products not covered by the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture and Doha Round agriculture negotiations. It in-
cludes not only industrial products, but also fish and fish products, forestry 
products, and mining products—though the terms “industrial” or “manufac-
tured” goods usually are meant to connote all such products.5 NAMA nego-
tiations are significant for at least two related reasons. First, industrial prod-
ucts account for nearly ninety percent of the value of world merchandise 
exports.6 Second, all or nearly all poor countries—Islamic and non-Islamic 
alike—seek to increase production and export capacity in their manufactur-
ing sector. That is because industrial products are higher value added than 
primary and processed farm goods. For poor countries to develop economi-
cally, increasing their output and exports of higher value added goods, and 
thereby their earnings, is essential. These two reasons have long been 
known, and the importance of industrialization in the development process 
  
 4 This author was among the optimists. See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on 
China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469, 1526 (2000) (asserting that 
China’s entry into the WTO would make it a more responsible global citizen); see also Raj 
Bhala, China, the WTO, and the Converse Question, J. OF COM., 26 Apr. 1999. 
 5 See A Simple Guide – NAMA Negotiations, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
markacc_e/nama_negotiations_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2012) [hereinafter NAMA Negotia-
tions Guide]. 
 6 Id. 
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is chronicled by (inter alia), Walt Rostow in his classic The Stages of Eco-
nomic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.7 
The December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text covered well-
trodden issues. Large swathes of the text were nearly identical to its July 
predecessor. The new Text, running 126 pages, covered familiar topics, and 
spotlighted choices facing the Members.8 There were few remarkable 
changes, meaning WTO Members had not narrowed, much less healed, ex-
isting schisms on the following matters. Indeed, several innovations in the 
December 2008 Text (e.g., on Swiss Formula Coefficients, flexibilities, and 
the anti-concentration clause) came directly from the Friday Night Proposal 
put forth by the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, in the July 2008 Min-
isterial meeting—the meeting that had broken up in disagreement.9 In turn, 
the April 2011 NAMA Document recorded few noteworthy developments, 
observing the “divergence in views between some Members about the ap-
propriate level of ambition,” which has been “the main stumbling block of 
the NAMA negotiations since mid-2008.”10 
A. Product Coverage 
Product, or binding, coverage is important because the greater such 
coverage, the more predictable trade is. If an industrial product tariff line is 
unbound, then the importing country can raise duty rates on that product 
with no ceiling limit. In contrast, if that line is bound, then exporters can be 
certain as to the maximum duty rate their product will face. Uruguay Round 
negotiators were successful, but not entirely so, in increasing the binding 
coverage for industrial products. Among developing countries, binding cov-
erage increased from twenty-one to seventy-three percent of all NAMA 
products.11 Accordingly, Doha Round negotiators—especially from devel-
oped countries—sought to increase this coverage yet more, ideally to one 
hundred percent. 
  
 7 W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 
(1968). 
 8 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1. This synopsis is based 
on a paragraph-by-paragraph, line-by-line comparison of the December 2008 and July 2008 
Draft NAMA Modalities Texts. See Negotiating Group on Market Access, Draft Modalities 
for Non-Agricultural Market Access, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.2 (July 10, 2008) [hereinafter July 
2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text]; see also The December 2008 Modalities Text Made 
Simple, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/guide_dec08_e.htm (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2012). 
 9 See Raj Bhala, Doha Round Schisms: Numerous, Technical, and Deep, 5 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 5, 147–50 (2008) (piecing together the proposal through extensive research); see also 
World Trade Talks End in Collapse, BBC (July 29, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi 
/business/7531099.stm (outlining reasons for the collapse of the DOHA round). 
 10 April 2011 NAMA Document, supra note 2, para. 2(i). 
 11 NAMA Negotiations Guide, supra note 5. 
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At the same time, developed countries had little to give in return. 
Through the post-Second World War multilateral trade rounds under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), they had generally in-
creased their binding coverage to high levels, and lowered their average 
industrial product tariffs following the Uruguay Round from 6.3 to 3.8 per-
cent. This asymmetry, namely, between low binding coverage and high tar-
iffs in poor countries, and high binding coverage and low tariffs in rich 
countries, bedeviled Doha Round NAMA negotiations. It was obvious, as 
was the burgeoning middle classes in the likes of Brazil, China, and India, 
to which American manufacturers looked for customers and salvation from 
the forces of long-term de-industrialization. In turn, for American negotia-
tors in the Round, the temptation of short-term mercantilism became irre-
sistible, at the expense of identifying NAMA strategies that would put poor 
people to work in high value-added sectors and thereby give them a stake in 
the capitalist world trading system, not in Islamist extremist ideology.  
As with the July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, the December 
2008 Text proclaimed that product coverage must be comprehensive, and no 
a priori exclusions would be allowed.12 Although that proclamation was 
technically correct, it lacked real meaning. 
True, back in November 2001 when they signed the Doha Devel-
opment Agenda (DDA), the WTO Members had not excluded from consid-
eration for tariff cuts any industrial products. Yet, ever since then they had 
labored mightily to make sure that their favored sectors—their sensitivi-
ties—were taken off the bargaining table or at least shielded partially from 
full trade liberalization commitments. Put succinctly, to say there are no a 
priori exclusions is not to mean there are no post hoc exceptions. After sev-
en years of negotiations over intricate minutiae, in retrospect it might well 
have been easier if at the Doha Ministerial Conference each Member had 
been permitted to designate ten products on which it would not negotiate.  
B. Swiss Formula Coefficients, the Mark Up, and Implementation Pe-
riods 
The Swiss Formula remained the methodology for industrial prod-
uct tariff cuts. This Formula would yield non-linear cuts, meaning that for 
any given Coefficient, the deepest percentage reductions would be imposed 
on the highest bound tariffs.13 Critically, the lower the absolute value of the 
Coefficient, the greater the percentage cut in the pre-Doha rate. The Coeffi-
  
 12 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 1–3, 6(a); see also 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 1–3, 6(a). 
 13 See Tariff Negotiations in Agriculture: Reduction Methods, WTO, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_swissformula_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2012) (providing an 
explanation and example of the Swiss Formula Coefficient). 
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cient in the formula also would set the maximum bound rate, i.e., the high-
est tariff peak. 
Cuts would be made to bound most favored nation (MFN) rates of 
duty. Any duties not expressed as an ad valorem tariff would have to be 
converted to their ad valorem equivalents (AVE) on the basis of the May 
2005 Paris Methodology.14 Generally, the result from applying the Formula 
to bound rates would be some reduction in tariff dispersion across countries 
and a mopping up of a significant amount of the water in tariff schedules. 
(“Water” is GATT-WTO slang for a positive difference between bound and 
applied rates.) But, the Formula would not soak up all the water, and prob-
lems of tariff escalation would remain.15 
For any unbound tariff line, a constant, non-linear markup would be 
applied to establish a base rate of duty from which to commence tariff cuts. 
The July 2008 Text called for a markup rate of twenty-five percentage 
points to applied MFN rates as a base level (as of 14 November 2001, the 
date on which the DDA was agreed).16 So, too, did the December Text. 
With one exception, the Swiss Formula remained the same in the 
December 2008 Text as its predecessor. The new Text simply split the dif-
ference on the Coefficient that developing countries could choose.17 So, the 
Formula and its Coefficients became: 
 
   {a or (x or y or z)} x t0 
 t1 = ___________________ 




 14 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 6(d)–(e); see 
also July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 6(d)–(e). The conversion 
methodology is laid out in Annex A of special session of the WTO committee on agriculture. 
Committee on Agriculture, Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture, 28–33, TN/AG/W/3 
(July 12, 2006). 
 15 See Defrosting Doha, THE ECONOMIST (July 17, 2008), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/11745498?story_id=11745498. Chile continues to be one of many examples of these 
problems. Chile’s overall applied MFN rate was 6 percent, so a cut (implied by both the 
December and July Texts) from 25 to 12 percent would give other Members no substantive 
market access gains. Likewise, the new Text did not eradicate the problem of tariff escala-
tion. The E.U.’s treatment of coffee provides an illustration. If coffee is unroasted and not 
decaffeinated, then it enters the E.U. duty-free. But, roasted and caffeinated coffee triggers 
an E.U. levy of 7.5 percent levy. Like its predecessor, the December Text would cut that duty 
in half—a notable decline—but would still result in some tariff escalation in a sector of im-
portance to many poor countries. See id. 
 16 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 6(b)–(c); July 2008 
Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 6(b)–(c). 
 17 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 5, 7(a)–(c); see 
also July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 5, 7(a)–(c). 
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  t1 = final bound rate of duty 
 
  t0 = base rate of duty 
 
  a = Coefficient of 8 for developed countries, instead of 7–9 as 
    in the July 2008 Text. 
 
  x = Coefficient of 20 for certain developing countries, instead 
    of 19–21 as in the July 2008 Text. 
 
  y = Coefficient of 22 for other developing countries, instead of 
    21–23 as in the July 2008 Text. 
 
  z = Coefficient of 25 for still other developing countries, 
    instead of 23–26 as in the July 2008 Text. 
 
Like its predecessor of July, the December Text applied the same Coeffi-
cient to all developed countries, but defined three developing country cate-
gories, to which Coefficient x, y, or z would apply. The Text permitted de-
veloping countries to self-designate their category, and thereby to choose 
the category-specific rules on flexibilities (discussed below) that would ap-
ply to them. 
Only about forty WTO Members (representing nearly ninety per-
cent of world trade, and including four recently acceded members (RAMs)) 
would apply the Swiss Formula.18 All developed countries would use it. For 
developed countries, the result of using the Swiss Formula with a Coeffi-
cient of eight would be a peak tariff of eight percent and bound tariffs at an 
average of far below eight percent—even below three percent.19 The result 
for the U.S. would be significant.20 Application of the Swiss Formula Coef-
ficient of eight to its bound tariffs would mean it would have to cut one 
hundred percent of its applied tariffs, with an average reduction to applied 
tariffs of over forty percent, and it would have to eliminate all tariff peaks. 
  
 18 See Briefing Notes: Non-Agricultural Market Access, WTO, http://www.wto.org/engl 
ish/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/nama_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2012) [hereinafter NAMA Brief-
ing Notes]. These Notes were posted in connection with the Seventh Ministerial Conference 
held in Geneva from November 30–December 2, 2009. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Daniel Pruzin, Key Emerging Nations Rule Out Improving Significantly Doha Of-
fers on Market Access, 27 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1669 (Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Pruzin, 
Key Emerging Nations] The U.S. ambassador to the WTO said that the market aces gains 
from the draft Doha texts were “not insignificant, but nor are they sufficient.” Id. 
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The consequent average American trade-weighted industrial tariff would be 
a mere 0.7 percent. 
What about developing countries obligated to apply the Swiss For-
mula? The answer depends on the developing country at issue, and in par-
ticular, (1) whether it is required to follow the Formula or benefits from 
some entitlement, and (2) the extent to which there is “water” in its tariff 
schedule. Brazil, for example, claimed that if it followed the Formula cuts to 
bound rates, then it would have to cut its applied rates by thirty-three per-
cent (in order to bring applied rates at or below the newly bound rates), and 
such cuts would affect sectors that it regarded as strategic, such as automo-
biles, footwear, and textiles.21 Overall, among developing countries obligat-
ed to follow the Formula, their average bound duty rate would fall to 11–12 
percent, with the majority of the tariff lines having a bound duty rate of less 
than 12–14 percent. Only a small number of their lines would have rates 
above fifteen percent. Small wonder, then, many developing countries 
sought exemptions of one sort or the other from the Swiss Formula. 
They were reasonably successful in doing so. The Swiss Formula 
would not apply in full force to the remaining 113 WTO Members, and no 
tariff reductions would be expected of the thirty-two least developed coun-
tries.22 Many developing countries would not apply the Formula at all or in 
part because they fell into a privileged category entitled to some kind of 
special and differential (S&D) treatment. These categories included the fol-
lowing: 
 
(1) Very recently acceded, or newer, RAMs. There were eleven of 
them—Albania, Armenia, Cape Verde, Saudi Arabia, Kyrgyz Re-
public, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Tonga, Vietnam, and 
Ukraine.23 
 
(2) Regular, or older, RAMs. There were seven of them—China, 
Croatia, Ecuador, Georgia, Jordan, Panama, and Taiwan (Chinese 
Taipei).24 
 
(3) Other older RAMs. There was one of them—Oman.25 
  
 21 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Voice Growing Concerns Over Stalemate in Doha 
Round Negotiations, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 382 (Mar. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Pruzin, 
WTO Members Voice Growing Concerns]. 
 22 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 14–17. 
 23 Id. para. 20. Another account records sixteen RAMs overall. NAMA Briefing Notes, 
supra note 18. 
 24 Sarita D. Jackson, Eurasian Bargaining, Agriculture, and the DOHA Round, 4 
CAUCASIAN REV. INT’L AFF. 285, 290 (2010). 
 25 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 7(g). 
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(4) Small, vulnerable economies (SVEs). There were thirty-one such 
Members, including Bolivia, Fiji, and Gabon.26 
 
(5) Developing countries with low levels of binding coverage. There 
were thirteen of them—Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, 
Ghana, Kenya, Macao, China, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Su-
riname, and Zimbabwe.27 
 
(6) Customs Union (CU) countries in the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU). There were five of them—Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.28 
 
(7) CU countries in MERCOSUR. There were four of them—
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.29 
 
(8) Other special countries. There were two of them—Argentina and 
Venezuela.30 
 
(9) Least developed countries. There were thirty-two of them, such as 
Bangladesh, none of which would have tariff-cutting obliga-
tions.31 
 
Implementation periods would differ as between developed and developing 
countries. 
In particular, developed countries would have five years from Janu-
ary 1st of the year after the entry into force of the Doha Round. Developing 
countries would have ten years from that date.32 Thus, if the effective date 
happened to be January 2nd, both groups of countries would get an addi-
tional year. That is, the earlier in the year the effective date, the greater the 
amount of time to phase in cuts. Certainly, by deferring tariff cuts by one 
extra year, from the perspective of trade liberalization, the December 2008 
Text was less ambitious than it might have been. 
  
 26 Id. para. 13(a). 
 27 Id. at n.5; NAMA Briefing Notes, supra note 18. 
 28 See December 2008 NAMA Modalities, supra note 1, para. 7(e). 
 29 See id. para. 7(f). 
 30 See id.  paras. 7(h)-(i). 
 31 See NAMA Briefing Notes, supra note 18. 
 32 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 6(f), 8(d); see 
also July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 6(f), 8(d). 
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In appraising the Swiss Formula and derogations therefrom, it is 
important to keep in mind that this Formula offers five potential benefits 
vis-à-vis the request-offer approach that was used during the early GATT 
Rounds to cut tariffs on a selective, product-by-product basis:33 
 
(1) Efficiency: It is easier to apply a formula (as long as the formula 
is simple) than to go through the cumbersome process of request-
offer. 
 
(2) Equity: Cutting a tariff depends on implementing a rule, that is, a 
formula, rather than on the relative balance of power between 
countries engaged in reciprocal request-offer bargaining. 
 
(3) Predictability: It is easier to prognosticate the aggregate results of 
cutting tariffs through a formula than the effects of product-by-
product cuts. 
 
(4) Problem-Solving: Depending on the precise formula, cutting tar-
iffs with a formula can address the problems of tariff peaks and 
tariff escalation. 
 
(5) Transparency: Every country knows the manner and amount by 
which every other country is cutting a tariff. 
 
In the Round, the long list of departures from the Swiss Formula, and the 
adulteration of what otherwise is a simple Formula with varying Coefficient 
values for Members, depending on their status, that do apply it, seriously 
undermined the value generally expected from using an arithmetic method 
to cut tariffs. To be sure, certain individual Members faced with the threat 
of Islamist extremism would gain from this adulterated Formula. But, the 
purported purpose of the Round to which Members dedicated themselves, 
i.e., a pursuit of a common good to fight poverty and terrorism, seemed lost 
amidst the adulterations. 
C. The Anti-Concentration Clause 
The December 2008 Draft Text contained an anti-concentration 
clause, a provision the EU had long championed.34 This clause barred ex-
clusion from Swiss Formula Cuts of an entire sector, that is, an entire Chap-
  
 33 Such advantages also are afforded by simpler formulas, such as the linear method ap-
plied by the GATT contracting parties in the Kennedy Round. 
 34 See Daniel Pruzin, Lack of Progress on Industrial Tariffs Sector; Hopes Fade for Con-
vening of WTO Ministerial, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1739 (Dec. 11, 2008). 
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ter of the Harmonized System (HS). To ensure use of the Formula in every 
Chapter, each WTO Member would be required to apply full Formula re-
ductions to a minimum of either twenty percent of total tariff lines under 
any HS product heading (e.g., automobiles, chemicals, and textiles and 
clothing), or nine percent of the total value of imports in each HS Chapter. 
The new Text was somewhat of a departure from its predecessor. 
The July Text contained an anti-concentration clause bearing two sharp 
rules.35 Developing countries would be forbidden from excluding an entire 
HS Chapter from tariff reductions. In each HS Chapter, these countries 
would have to apply full formula tariff cuts to a certain minimum percent-
age of national tariff lines, or a certain minimum percentage of the value of 
imports (of the developing country in question). Yet, given India’s strenu-
ous opposition to the clause, the July 2008 Text failed to state what the min-
imum figures would be.36 Whether, in the intervening 6 months, India had 
warmed to the figures in the December 2008 Text was unclear. 
III. RESTRICTING INDUSTRIAL MARKET ACCESS THROUGH FLEXIBILITIES 
A. Flexibilities for Developing Countries 
Not all developing countries necessarily would apply the same 
Swiss Formula Coefficient. They would have policy space to choose the 
right balance between the depth of industrial tariff cuts, on the one hand, 
and flexibility to deviate from the full force of such cuts and thereby protect 
sensitive manufacturing sectors, on the other hand. As intimated earlier, the 
higher the value of the Coefficient, the less severe the depth of the cuts; 
conversely, the lower the value, the greater the cuts. In other words, the 
Coefficient and the strength of the cuts are inversely related. Logically, if a 
developing country chooses a low Coefficient, such as 20, then it should be 
rewarded with greater flexibility. In contrast, choosing the highest permissi-
ble Coefficient, 25, should have the consequence of no flexibility. 
That scheme is what the December 2008 Draft Text, like its prede-
cessor, called for. The new Text made minor adjustments to the precise 
flexibility figures, namely, choosing the mid-points of ranges laid out in the 
  
 35 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 7(d); July 2008 Draft 
NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 7(d). 
 36 See Developing Countries, EU Seek Changes to New WTO Negotiating Draft, DOMAIN-
B.COM (July 12, 2008), http://www.domain-b.com/organisation/wto/20080712_wto.html 
(quoting an unnamed Indian official saying “India will not accept a deal that includes an anti-
concentration clause,” and reporting that “Indian officials have also called for an increase in 
the level of protection proposed in the farm text for small and marginal farmers.”). 
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July 2008 Text.37 Accordingly, the December Text established the following 
three flexibilities, any one of which developing countries could select: 
 
(1) If a developing country selects 25, then it would have no flexibil-
ity.38 There are no industrial product tariff lines it can shield, par-
tially or wholly, from the full agreed-upon tariff reductions. 
 
(2) If a developing country opts for 20, then it has maximum flexibil-
ity.39 It can choose between one of two flexibility options. First, it 
could shield 14 percent of its industrial product tariff lines from 
the full force of agreed-upon Swiss Formula cuts, subjecting these 
lines to half the agreed cuts. However, the value of industrial 
trade represented by these shielded lines must not exceed sixteen 
percent of the total value of industrial product imports into the 
developing country in question. Second, as an alternative flexibil-
ity, the developing country could keep 6.5 percent of its industrial 
product tariff lines unbound, or exclude them entirely from any 
tariff cuts, as long as the value of trade represented by these lines 
does not exceed 7.5 percent of the total value of industrial product 
imports. 
 
(3) If a developing country chooses the middle Coefficient, 22, then 
it has a medium degree of flexibility.40 It has two options. First, it 
could decide to immunize ten percent of its industrial product tar-
iff lines from the full cuts, and impose on them a cut of no less 
than half of that required by the Swiss Formula. However, these 
shielded lines must not exceed ten percent of the total value of its 
industrial product imports. Second, as an alternative flexibility, 
the developing country could keep five percent of its industrial 
product tariff lines unbound, or exclude five percent of its lines 
from any Swiss Formula cuts, provided these lines do not amount 
to more than five percent of the total value of its industrial prod-
uct imports. 
 
Obviously, the limitations on value of trade associated with the flexibilities 
under the Coefficients of 20 and 22 are designed to ensure that a developing 
country does not abuse the flexibilities, shielding so many industrial product 
  
 37 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 7(a)–(c); see 
also July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 7(a)–(c). 
 38 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 7(c). 
 39 See id. paras. 7(a)(i)–(ii). 
 40 See id. paras. 7(b)(i)–(ii). 
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tariff lines as to scupper the Swiss Formula cuts. Overall, the scheme is a 
sliding scale, with progressively more flexibility to protect sensitive indus-
trial products in exchange for concomitantly deeper cuts to bound MFN 
duties overall in the manufacturing sector. Developed countries, of course, 
could not avail themselves of this flexibility—they all would be obliged to 
use the Coefficient of 8 without any derogation. 
B. Further Flexibilities for CUs, Plus Argentina and Venezuela 
The December 2008 Text contained all the details of sui generis 
flexibilities for certain poor countries and customs unions (CUs), and even 
added more of them. First, all countries in SACU—Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, and Swaziland, as well as South Africa—would have recourse to a 
common list of flexibilities in their tariff schedules. The new Text eliminat-
ed an additional provision from the July 2008 text that would have permit-
ted SACU countries to add percentage points to the percent of non-
agricultural tariff lines they could shield from the full force of formula cuts. 
The July Text slated SACU countries for Coefficient y of 21–23, under 
which a normal developing country could apply less than formula cuts to up 
to ten percent of industrial tariff lines as long as those lines did not exceed 
ten percent of the total value of that country’s non-agricultural imports With 
the additional flexibility, SACU countries would have been able to apply 
less than formula cuts to 11–16 percent of their industrial tariff lines.41 
Presumably, SACU countries believed that their common list of 
flexibilities would more than offset the deletion of this additional provision, 
provided that they scheduled industrial tariff lines on that list broadly and 
skillfully. Under the December 2008 Text, that list would permit SACU to 
exempt a further three percent of industrial tariff lines beyond the sixteen 
percent from the July Text and from Swiss Formula reductions. SACU in-
tended to use the additional flexibility to shield labor-intensive textile and 
apparel (T&A) industries. Subsequently, on seventeen December 2008, the 
NAMA Chairman proposed the following in response to South Africa’s 
request for additional flexibilities under the Formula:42 
 
(1) SACU countries would have a common list of flexibilities in their 
tariff schedules through which they could exempt a further six 
percent of their industrial tariff lines from Swiss Formula cuts if 
they selected a Swiss Formula Coefficient of 22. Alternatively, 
they could exempt a further eight percent of those lines if they 
chose a Coefficient of 20. In other words, their flexibility in-
  
 41 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities, supra note 1, para. 7(e), with July 
2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 7(e). 
 42 See April 2011 NAMA Document, supra note 2, para. 2(ii). 
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volved a trade-off: the higher the Coefficient value (22 versus 
20), the lower the exemption from cuts (6 versus 8), because a 
higher value results in a lower percentage cut to industrial tariffs. 
For example, if a SACU country chose a Coefficient of 22, then 
under the December 2008 NAMA Text, it could exempt up to ten 
percent of its industrial product tariff lines from the full force of 
Swiss Formula cuts (imposing half the required cuts).43 Under the 
Chairman’s December 17 proposal, they could exempt a further 
six percent from the full force of the cuts, for a total of eleven 
percent (10 + 6) of its tariff lines exempt from the full cut. With-
out this additional flexibility, they could shield just ten percent of 
their industrial tariff lines from the full cuts, up to ten percent of 
the value of their total manufactured output. 
 
(2) Of the six or eight percent of the exempt industrial tariff lines, a 
SACU member would have to focus three percent of those lines 
on textile and clothing items (HS Chapters 61–62),44 and possibly 
also footwear.45 
 
(3) SACU countries would have a special grace period in which to 
implement Swiss Formula tariff cuts, namely, if they chose a Co-
efficient of 22, then three years (in equal annual installments ef-
fective  January 1st) and if they chose a Coefficient of 20, then 
five years.46 Here again, their flexibility posed a trade-off: less 
drastic cuts for a longer phase in period for those cuts, or vice 
versa. 
 
This proposal—which essentially was one for S&D treatment in SACU 
infant industries—met with stern objections from the U.S. and EU. They 
insisted that SACU implement tariff reductions on those lines in three years 
and join in participating in at least two sectoral negotiations (discussed be-
low).47 The April 2011 NAMA Document indicated the disagreement be-
  
 43 See id. para. 2(ii); see also December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note1, 
para. 7(b)(i) (tariff lines cannot exceed 10 percent of total value of non-agricultural imports). 
 44 April 2011 NAMA Document, supra note 2, para. 2 (ii). 
 45 Id. 
 46 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text supra note 1, paras. 5, 13(e) (explaining 
the coefficient system in relation to tariff elimination period requirements); see also id. para. 
2(ii) & n.3. 
 47 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Insists on Developing Country Participation on Sectoral for 
Chemicals, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1743 (Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Pruzin, Sectoral 
for Chemicals]. 
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tween SACU, on the one side, and the U.S. and EU, on the other side, re-
mained unresolved.48 
Second, like the July 2008 Text, the December 2008 Text singled 
out MERCOSUR countries by name for favoritism.49 These countries insist-
ed that any position taken in the Doha Round must be harmonized with the 
interests of each one of them, i.e., that their bloc required a unified posi-
tion.50 Thus, under the Text, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
would have a common list of flexibilities in their tariff schedules. To deter-
mine the value of trade limitation (i.e., the restriction on the percentage of 
industrial tariff lines they could shield from the full force of cuts under the 
Swiss Formula), each country would not have to use the total value of its 
non-agricultural imports. Rather, the total value of Brazil’s industrial im-
ports would set the limit for all MERCOSUR countries. Because the value of 
Brazil’s industrial imports is significantly larger than the value of the non-
agricultural imports of Argentina, Paraguay, or Uruguay, the latter three 
countries would be able to shield a larger value of trade from agreed-upon 
formula cuts than otherwise would be the case.51 
Significantly, following issuance of the July 2008 Text, Argentina 
had adamantly rejected this approach.52 It argued that because of the com-
mon external tariff (CET) associated with MERCOSUR, the individual 
countries in MERCOSUR would be forced to divide up among themselves 
the total number of tariff lines they are allowed to protect. (Of course, that 
would be a reality for any CU.) One country within MERCOSUR, but not 
another, might consider a line to be sensitive. Thus, the total number of 
lines that the countries could shield would have to be large enough to ac-
commodate the varying individual country interests. From Argentina’s per-
  
 48 See April 2011 NAMA Document, supra note 2, para. 2(ii) & n. 4 (inferring that “other 
members” refers to U.S. and EU opposition to special grace period for SACU countries). 
 49 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 7(f), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 7(f) (identifying Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). 
 50 See David Haskel, Brazil to Harmonize Doha Round Stance with Mercosur Partners, 
Paraguay Says, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1038 (July 30, 2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, Mer-
cosur Partners] (discussing how a unified position is required in light of the stalled Doha 
Round of global trade talks). 
 51 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Cites Need to Broaden Doha Talks Beyond Agriculture, 
NAMA, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 988 (July 23, 2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, Beyond Agri-
culture] (noting that Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay as member of Mercosure would be 
provided additional flexibilities to protect sensitive sectors). 
 52 See David Haskel & Ed Taylor, NAMA Final Draft Text Still Inadequate After Changes, 
Argentina Tells MERCOSUR, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1047 (July 17, 2008) [hereinafter 
Pruzin, Argentina Tells Mercosur] (noting that the concessions offered to Mercosur members 
were insufficient). 
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spective, the July—and, by inference, December—2008 Text was wanting 
in this regard. 
Third, the December 2008 Text identified two Latin American 
countries—Argentina and Venezuela—for special treatment.53 In so doing, 
it departed from its predecessor, as the July Text had not so clearly singled 
out these countries. This departure meant that the new Text continued the 
trend of entertaining the possibility of further metastasizing of special 
treatment. As the April 2011 NAMA Document recorded, Venezuela con-
tinued to insist that it faced “structural problems” in its “foreign trade bal-
ance” and, therefore, that it “still need[ed] to negotiate additional flexibili-
ties.”54 Likewise, Argentina affirmed “its continuous need for additional 
flexibilities.”55 
As for Argentina, the December 2008 Text did not spell out what 
goodies it might get beyond the MERCOSUR provisions. That would be a 
matter for further negotiation. Argentina insisted on a Swiss Formula Coef-
ficient of 35 with the right to designate sixteen percent of its industrial tariff 
lines as subject to half the agreed cuts (with no limitation on the volume of 
trade covered by these lines).56 Alternatively, if its Coefficient were above 
25 and below 35, then it would require not only the 16 percent dispensation, 
but also the right to exempt 8 percent of its tariff lines from any tariff cut. 
Argentina’s demands were stunningly greater than the most generous flexi-
bilities afforded by the Text to developing countries. Argentina justified 
them by the fact that its trade deficit in industrial goods had skyrocketed by 
thirty-eight percent, from $86 million in 2002 to $22 billion in 2007. Trade 
liberalization in manufacturing, it said, would cause social unrest. As for 
Venezuela, the July 2008 Text had explained it would be treated as an 
SVE.57 The December 2008 Text backed away from such specificity, and 
simply left the matter up to consultations.  
  
 53 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 7(h)–(i). 
 54 April 2011 NAMA Document, supra note 2, para. 2(iv). 
 55 Id. para. 2(iii). 
 56 See Daniel Pruzin, Argentina Pushes Special Treatment for Sensitive Sectors in NAMA 
Talks, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1708 (Dec. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Pruzin, Special Treat-
ment for Sensitive Sectors]. 
 57 See July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 7(g). Before issuance 
of the July 2008 Text, Venezuela had succeeded in arguing it deserved unique treatment 
because of the highly concentrated pattern of its imports, and its particular development 
needs. Thus, the July Text slated Venezuela for Coefficient x, 19–21, and said it would have 
recourse to a certain (but as yet unspecified) number of additional percentage points to com-
pute the value of trade limitation. Id. That is, a normal developing country applying Coeffi-
cient x would have been able to apply less than formula cuts on up to 12–14 percent of indus-
trial tariff lines, as long as those lines did not exceed 12–19 percent of the total value of its 
non-agricultural trade. Venezuela would have had a trade limitation higher than 12–19 per-
cent of its non-farm trade. The U.S. argued against this special dispensation for Venezuela, 
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C. Still Further Flexibilities for Members Engaged in Sectoral       
Negotiations 
None of the flexibilities directly address Islamic countries or coun-
tries with large Muslim communities. That is the first short-coming: the 
flexibilities are not linked to fighting VEOs through poverty alleviation. 
Rather, they are a hodgepodge of exceptions arising from bargaining power, 
luck, or some other unprincipled factor. The second flaw is that the exist-
ence of so many flexibilities triggered a backlash from the U.S. and other 
developed countries that pulled the NAMA negotiations even further from 
the founding purpose of the Doha Round. These rich countries demanded a 
better deal on industrial products for themselves. Hence, the focus of the 
negotiations devolved onto reciprocity. 
Accordingly, the idea of sectoral agreements would be to eliminate 
duties, over a phase-out period, on all specified tariff lines in a designated 
economic sector, effectively creating a duty-free zone in that sector. Devel-
oping countries would have the same trade liberalizing obligation, but they 
would get an extended period in which to drop their tariffs in the sector to 
zero, and they possibly would have the right to maintain low duty rates on 
some tariff lines in the sector.58 
The word “guarantee” captures the crux of the issue on sectoral ne-
gotiations. Some WTO Members need more clarity or predictability as to 
the participation of other Members in sectoral negotiations, so that the out-
come of those negotiations is not entirely unknown, before they are willing 
to agree to NAMA modalities. Other Members are willing to enter into good 
faith talks on liberalizing trade in certain sectors. However, these Members 
refuse to pre-judge the outcome of those talks by declaring that they will 
join one or more sectoral agreements. The Members in the two camps re-
mained the same between issuance of the July and December 2008 Texts. 
The U.S., along with Canada and the EU, demanded something 
closer to a guarantee. For them, the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barri-
ers to trade in specific manufacturing sectors in which they had an export 
interest was critical. This elimination would offset (at least partly) the lack 
of trade liberalization that would result from flexibilities accorded to devel-
oping countries under the Swiss Formula, and from extra-special treatment 
  
contending there were 20 other developing countries that met the SVE criteria better than 
Venezuela. See also Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Firm on NAMA Sectoral Commitments, As Chair 
Issues Warning on Unresolved Items, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1013 (July 10, 2008) 
[hereinafter Pruzin, U.S. Firm on NAMA Sectoral Commitments]. 
 58 See Daniel Pruzin, Doha Chairs Issue Final Revised Draft Texts on NAMA and Agricul-
ture with Few Changes, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1044 (July 17, 2008) [hereinafter 
Pruzin, Agriculture with Few Changes] (expressing that developing nations have flexibility 
to “shield sensitive industrial tariff from those agreed cuts.”). 
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to the CU countries in SACU and MERCOSUR, RAMs, SVEs, and least 
developed countries. In other words, major emerging countries like Brazil, 
China, and India would have to make additional concessions, beyond what 
the Swiss Formula obligated them to do, because that Formula was so rid-
dled with exceptions that the U.S. industrial product exporters would not 
gain much market access in these countries without additional concessions. 
Accordingly, of the fourteen contemplated sectoral agreements 
(listed below), the U.S. insisted specifically that China, India, and Brazil 
participate in at least two of them.59 For China and the other Group of Seven 
(G-7) countries, the U.S. demanded that one of those two be the chemicals 
agreement, and that they give a high priority to electronics and industrial 
machinery.60 By October 2009, the American position solidified: there 
would be no Doha Round deal without participation by Brazil, China, and 
India in some sectoral agreements, especially chemical products, electronic 
goods, and industrial machinery.61 
There were solid commercial grounds for the American emphasis 
on chemicals. Tariffs on them are low in developed countries—on average, 
the applied tariff rate in the U.S. is 3.7 percent, in Canada 2.7 percent, in the 
EU 4.4 percent, and in Japan 2.4 percent.62 But, the average applied duty 
rate on chemical imports is 6.5 percent in China, and higher still in Brazil, 
India, and Mexico.63 China is the world’s third largest chemical producer 
(after the U.S. and EU, respectively).64 (One account ranks China second.)65 
China accounts for ten percent of global chemical imports (as of 2005), and 
  
 59 See Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO’s Lamy Calls Off Doha  Ministerial; Deal 
Up to Obama Team, U.S. Official Says, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1766 (Dec. 18,  2008) 
[hereinafter Pruzin, Lamy Calls Off Doha]; see also Daniel Pruzin, Lack of Progress on 
Industrial Tariffs Sector; Hopes Fade for Convening of WTO Ministerial, 25 INT’L TRADE 
REP. (BNA) 1739–41 (Dec. 11,  2008) [hereinafter Pruzin, Lack of Progress on Industrial 
Tariffs]. 
 60 Pruzin, Sectoral Chemicals, supra note 47. For WTO purposes, the G-7 consists of 
Australia, Brazil, China, India, Japan, EU, and U.S. Id. 
 61 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Told to Tone Down Demands If Doha Round Deal to be Con-
cluded, 27 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 775 (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter Pruzin, U.S. Told to 
Tone Down Demands]; see also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Warns 2010 Deadline for Doha 
Hard to Meet without “Serious Acceleration,” 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1414 (Oct. 22, 
2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, 2010 Deadline for Doha]. 
 62 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Frustrated with Lack of Interest by China in NAMA Chemicals 
Sectoral, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1003–04 (July 23, 2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, U.S. 
Frustrated]. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Daniel Pruzin, Chinese Official Adamant in Opposing Doha Round “Sectoral” on 
Chemicals, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1312 (Oct. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, Opposing 
Doha Round] (expressing there is no reason for China to refuse participation in the sectoral 
agreement because China is one of the biggest chemical producers in the world). 
File: Bhala 2 Created on:  2/23/2012 4:21:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:24:00 PM 
344 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:325 
seven percent of global exports.66 The U.S. argued chemicals were hit with 
an accumulation of tariffs if they are exported, processed, and re-exported, 
which they typically are, because most chemicals shipped abroad are inputs 
into other chemical manufacturing.67 As for Brazil, it is the sixth largest 
importer of chemicals in the world (as of July 2010).68 The U.S. hoped that 
Brazil would join China and India in signing and adhering to the Uruguay 
Round Chemicals Tariff Harmonization Agreement (CTHA), which cuts 
chemical import tariffs to 0, 5.5, or 6.5 percent.69 Similarly, the U.S. asked 
Brazil to join the 1997 Information Technology Agreement (ITA) from that 
Round, to which (as of November 2010) 73 WTO Members adhered, and 
which cut to zero tariffs on computers, semiconductors, telecommunications 
equipment, and other high-technology items.70 
In brief, from the American perspective, market access in a key sec-
tor was at stake. Under a chemicals sectoral agreement, duties on all chemi-
cal tariff lines, which under the HS tariff classification system are set out in 
Chapters 28–39 (and which were covered by the CTHA), would be elimi-
nated.71 Developed countries would have six years to phase out their chemi-
cal tariffs, and developing countries would have 11 years.72 Flexibility 
would be allowed to poor countries, in that they could exclude four percent 
of their chemical tariff lines from the obligation to eliminate duties.73 In-
stead, they could maintain a tariff on the favored lines of up to 4 percent ad 
valorem.74 They also would have a further five years, beyond the eleven 
year phase out period, in which to eliminate tariffs on up to five percent of 
their chemical product lines.75 
  
 66 See Pruzin, U.S. Frustrated, supra note 62. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 There are 50 WTO Members that have signed the Agreement. See Daniel Pruzin, Punke 
Says U.S. Frustrated by Talks with Brazil, China, India on Doha Tariffs, 27 INT’L TRADE 
REP. (BNA) 973 (July 1, 2010) [hereinafter Pruzin, Brazil, China, India on Doha Tariffs]. 
 70 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Envoy Hears Positive Tone on Doha, But Actual Negotiations 
Are Still Missing, 27 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1757 (Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Pruzin, 
U.S. Envoy Hears Positive Tone] (addressing how Brazil, the world’s tenth largest economy, 
has yet to sign another sectoral agreement, the Information Technology Agreement, while 
other developing countries have signed). 
 71 See generally December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, Annex 6, § 
3, para. 10 (discussing liberalization of tariffs in the chemicals sector). 
 72 Pruzin, U.S. Frustrated, supra note 62, at 1003–04. 
 73 See id. (stating that poor or developing nations have flexibility in commitment to elimi-
nate tariffs).  
 74 Id. (noting the maximum tariff percentage that can be maintained by developing na-
tions). 
 75 Id. 
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Of course, the idea of flexibilities within any sectoral agreement 
was oxymoronic. The whole point of a sectoral agreement is to offset im-
balances perceived by the U.S. and other major trading nations caused by 
flexibilities in the main body of obligations in the Doha Round negotiating 
texts. Apparently, then, flexibilities in a sectoral agreement were a political 
cost that the U.S. would have to accept to get the likes of China to partici-
pate at all. This political cost came despite arguments from the Americans 
that China, along with many developing countries, would benefit from zero-
duty global chemicals trade.76 
Nevertheless, China was distinctly uninterested in a chemicals sec-
toral agreement. To the frustration of the U.S., China argued that its chemi-
cals tariffs, which it brought down as part of its WTO accession agreement 
that entered into force on December 11, 2001, ranged from 1.5 to 6.5 per-
cent—hardly much of a barrier.77 Moreover, said China, the American ar-
gument that countries competitive in a sector—like China is in chemicals—
should participate in a sectoral is offset by the fact that the more competitive 
a country is in a particular sector, the more vulnerable it is to trade remedy 
actions.78 Overall in respect of industrial tariffs, China proclaimed that as a 
result of implementing its WTO accession commitments, they were lower 
than in most developing countries.79 
China also accused the U.S. of hypocrisy.80 China argued that an-
nexes in the December 2008 Draft NAMA Text would permit the U.S. to 
phase out tariff reductions on sensitive products like textiles and clothes 
over an extended period so that it could maintain preferences under the Cen-
tral American Free Trade Agreement – Dominican Republic (CAFTA–DR) 
and African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).81 Why should the U.S. 
and EU be allowed to protect their sensitive products and preferences, but 
demand that China liberalize trade on chemicals, which are of some sensi-
tivity to it? 
  
 76 As an example, the U.S. and Canada import aluminum oxide, an ingredient in light 
bulbs and spark plugs, from countries like Brazil and India. Id. 
 77 See Pruzin, Opposing Doha Round, supra note 65, at 1312 (noting that tariffs on chemi-
cals are already low). 
 78 Id. 
 79 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Chamber Official Cites Concerns on China’s Lack of Engage-
ment in WTO Talks, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1498 (Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, 
China’s Lack of Engagement]. 
 80 See Alan Beattie, Negotiators Sift Debris, FIN. TIMES (July 29, 2008), http://www.ft. 
com/cms/s/0/dde1e23a-5da0-11dd-8129-000077b07658,s01=1.html#axzz1eMVmtJzZ 
(“[A]ccusing the U.S . . . for heavily subsidizing its own cotton farmers  . . . while asking 
other countries to expose theirs to harsh competition.”).  
 81 See, e.g., December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, Annex 6, § 13 
(expressing that the modality for tariff reduction end rate is to be “as close to zero as possi-
ble”). 
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Worse yet, China, India, Brazil, and other developing countries re-
fused to give a guarantee about their participation in any sectoral agree-
ment.82 They continued to counter with five arguments. First, why should 
G-7 countries be saddled with sectoral obligations, but not major developing 
countries, such as Indonesia, Mexico, and Korea? There was no principled 
basis to differentiate between developing countries within and outside the 
G-7. 
Second, there was no obvious coincidence of interests in some sec-
tors. For example, the EU sought an accord for duty-free treatment on tex-
tiles, clothing, and footwear.83 But, that would mean opening to free trade a 
broad swathe of domestic industries the U.S. had long sought to protect 
from further erosion in their global competitive position, and from Chinese 
T&A firms. The National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO), an 
American lobbying group, alleged that the Chinese firms were receiving 
increased export subsidies.84 As another illustration, Brazil pointed out that 
in some sectors—such as automobiles, chemicals, electronics, and machin-
ery—the tariff lines for which the U.S. sought duty reductions were the 
same lines Brazil sought to protect.85 Brazil accused the U.S. of “greed” 
adduced by its excessive demands that emerging countries open entire in-
dustrial sectors to foreign competition, an ironic stab given that the Ameri-
can pressure for market access was no more or less greed-driven than Bra-
zilian insistence on protection.86 The U.S. retorted that both the August 
2004 Framework Agreement and December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference Declaration contained language emphasizing that sectoral nego-
tiations would be a key element of any Doha Round deal, yet Brazil, China, 
India, and other Members had utterly failed to take these talks seriously.87 
Third, participation in sectoral negotiations never was intended to 
be mandatory. The DDA negotiating mandate makes clear that involvement 
  
 82 See Frances Williams, WTO Fails to Set Outline Deal Date, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2008), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ac3a0ac8-c565-11dd-b516-000077b07658.html#axzz1eMVm 
tJzZ (discussing the failure to set a date for a ministerial meeting to set forth an outline deal 
in global trade talks). 
 83 See Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Prod-
ucts, TN/MA/W/93/Rev.1 (Sept. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Market Access for Non-Agricultural 
Products]. 
 84 See NCTO Calls for Tough Action from Obama on China as Textile Export Subsidies 
Rise, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1719 (Dec. 4, 2008). 
 85 See Haskel & Taylor, supra note 52. 
 86 See Alan Beattie & Frances Williams, WTO Chief Drops Plans to Press Ministers for 
Outline Doha Deal, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2008, at 3; Daniel Pruzin, Brazil’s Amorim Urges 
Obama Administration to Send Positive Signal, Salvage Doha Talks, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. 
(BNA) 1769 (Dec. 18, 2008). 
 87 See Pruzin & Yerkey, supra 59, at 1766–77. 
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in sectoral negotiations is voluntary.88 Indeed, so too do the August 2004 
Framework Agreement and December 2005 Ministerial Declaration. China 
worried that the term “critical mass” was a code for forcing it to participate 
in sectoral talks, because of China’s significance as an importer (as well as 
exporter).89 In other words, proposals to define “critical mass” as a required 
percentage of world trade coverage by a sectoral agreement were thinly 
veiled efforts to compel Chinese participation in the negotiations. 
Fourth, even one sectoral agreement could have dramatic effects on 
developing countries. Concerned about its own domestic sector, China re-
jected what it characterized would be massive tariff cuts on chemical prod-
ucts covering roughly 1,600 such items.90 Mexico provided another in-
stance. If Mexico accepted a zero-for-zero proposal in the chemical sector, 
thereby providing duty-free treatment to all chemical products if other WTO 
Members did so, too, then overall tariff cuts by Mexico would fall by one-
third more than called for under the Swiss Formula. Still other examples 
were afforded by beneficiaries of preferential trade agreements covering 
T&A.91 A sectoral agreement on this merchandise would erode their margin 
of preference, possibly to zero if the accord ushered in duty-free treatment 
in the sector. Brazil pointed out that in chemicals, the U.S. demanded zero 
tariffs on 1,700 chemical products.92 Overall, Brazil intoned, if it suc-
cumbed to American pressure to unwind NAMA flexibilities through partic-
ipation in sectoral agreements, its effective Swiss Formula Coefficient 
would fall from 20 to 10.93 
Fifth, empirical evidence clearly indicated the biggest beneficiaries 
from sectoral agreements would be developed countries, particularly the 
U.S., EU, and Japan in respect of chemicals, electric and electronic goods, 
environmental products, and high-tech merchandise.94 That result would 
occur because tariffs in these sectors are low in developed countries, but 
  
 88 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 9. 
 89 See Daniel Pruzin, NAMA Sectorals Take Center Stage on First Day of Intensified Doha 
Talks, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1671 (Nov. 27, 2008). 
 90 See Pruzin, WTO Members Voice Growing Concerns, supra note 21; Pruzin, Key 
Emerging Nations, supra note 20; Bradley S. Klapper, Doha Deal Falters as WTO Fails to 
Set Meeting Date, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/ 
2008-12-08-346700137_x.htm. 
 91 See Daniel Pruzin, Chair Admits Deadlock on Three Key Issues in NAMA Negotiations, 
25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1719 (Dec. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Pruzin, Chair Admits Dead-
lock]. 
 92 See Pruzin, WTO Members Voice Growing Concerns, supra note 21. 
 93 See Pruzin, Key Emerging Nations, supra note 20. 
 94 See Daniel Pruzin, NCTO Calls for Tough Action from Obama on China as Textile 
Export Subsidies Rise, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1719 (Dec. 4, 2008) (referring to a study 
released August 19, 2009 by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, 
D.C., the findings of which confirmed Brazil’s conclusions). 
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relatively higher in developing ones. The asymmetry, if corrected through 
sectoral deals, would lead to net increases in developed country exports, a 
boost in exports in certain sectors from some developing countries (such as 
Brazil, India, and China), but an overall net trade deficit in even those sec-
tors and developing countries. In other words, statistical projections indicat-
ed it was not in the self-interest of developing countries to sign sectoral 
agreements. 
The thrust of the December 2008 Text on possible sectoral agree-
ments was the same as that of its predecessor. But, the wording was differ-
ent in an effort to please WTO Members on both sides of the schism.95 Like 
its predecessor, the December 2008 Text affirmed that participation in sec-
toral negotiations was voluntary.96 It hastened to add that for some Members 
(namely, the U.S., Canada, and EU), sectoral initiatives that achieve a “crit-
ical mass of participation” help achieve an overall balanced outcome in 
NAMA. The December Text also made changes that were more than cos-
metic. The new Text, unlike its predecessor, assembled a six-point com-
promise:97 
 
(1) Participation in sectoral negotiations would not be mandatory. 
 
(2) Members would commit to join in sectoral negotiations, on a self-
identifying basis, at the time they agreed to the Swiss Formula 
Coefficients. Within forty-five days of that agreement, the partic-
ipating Members would name the specific sectoral negotiations in 
which they would participate. 
 
(3) Members would participate in sectoral negotiations with a view to 
making these initiatives “viable.” 
 
(4) Results of sectoral negotiations should not be pre-judged, and 
participation by any particular Member in a sectoral initiative 
should not prejudge whether that Member ultimately decides to 
join a final deal. At the same time, a critical mass of participation 
would help balance the overall outcome of NAMA negotiations. 
 
(5) Results of the negotiations would form part of a single undertak-
ing. 
  
 95 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 9–12, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 9–12. 
 96 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 9. 
 97 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 9, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 9. 
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(6) There would be no credit for participation, i.e., no compensation, 
in the form of a larger Swiss Formula Coefficient, for developing 
countries.98 
 
The December Text stated a revised schedule for conducting these negotia-
tions.99 But, the compromise failed to placate either the U.S. or China, 
which was a key reason that the WTO Director-General opted not to call a 
meeting among trade ministers before year-end 2008. 
The new Text explicitly discussed the possibility, in more focused 
terms than its predecessor, of S&D treatment for developing countries on 
zero-for-x tariff cuts. For developing countries, a zero-for-x approach would 
mean more generous treatment (1) under the tariff-cutting strategy in a par-
ticular sector than for developed countries, (2) as to implementation periods 
(i.e., giving them more time than developed countries to cut tariffs in a sec-
tor), and (3) partial product coverage (i.e., permitting them to exempt from 
tariff cuts certain goods).100  
The December 2008 Text reproduced Annex 6, the same Annex 
contained in the July Text. That Annex was a 47-page summary of sectoral 
proposals, and the draft modalities for liberalizing tariffs, in fourteen sec-
tors. Table I, below, lists those sectors, the Member proponent, and what 
that proponent sought in terms of a “critical mass” as defined by a percent-
age of world trade.101 Note that the proponents and their allies cut across a 
variety of Members, both developed and developing, meaning that the de-







 98 See Pruzin, Chair Admits Deadlock, supra note 91. 
 99 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 12, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 12. 
100 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 10–11 (explain-
ing in the last sentence of para. 10, the EU and U.S. would list (in Annexes 2 and 3, respec-
tively) products they would exclude from sectoral initiatives (i.e., to which they would not 
apply trade liberalizing commitments for their import markets)). These products were the 
subject of non-reciprocal preferences, and essentially would be treated under the provisions 
covering such preferences. Id. 
101 The data in this Table is extracted from Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Cites Need for Two-Track 
Approach for Concluding WTO’s Doha Round Talks, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 696 (May 
28, 2009). See FACTBOX: Sectoral Deals at the WTO Trade Talks, REUTERS (May 28, 
2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/28/us-trade-wto-sectorals-idUSL 
863602220080728. 
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TABLE I: 
SECTORAL NEGOTIATIONS PROPOSED IN DECEMBER 2008 DRAFT 
NAMA TEXT 
 
Industrial Sector WTO Member Proposing 
Sectoral Negotiation with 
a View to Global Duty-
Free Treatment in that 
Sector (Other Members 
favoring a Sectoral 
Agreement) 
Critical Mass 
(minimum percentage of 
global trade in the sector 
that would be covered by 
the sectoral agreement) 
Automotive and related 
parts 
Japan 99% in cars 
98% in car parts 
Bicycles and related parts Taiwan 90% 
Chemicals U.S. 




Electronics and electrical 
products 
Japan Not defined 
Enhanced health care 
(health care products), 
pharmaceutical and medical 
devices 
U.S. Not defined 
Fish and fish products Norway 90% 
Forestry products, possibly 
including paper and pulp 
products 
Canada 
(Hong Kong, New Zea-




Gems and jewelry Thailand 
(EU) 
90% of trade among WTO 
Members 
Hand tools Taiwan 90% 
Industrial machinery Canada 




Raw materials United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) 
90% 
Sports equipment Taiwan 90% 
Textiles, clothing, and 
footwear 
EU Not defined 
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Manifestly, the proponents are among (or seek to be among) the 
leading producer-exporters in the sector for which they seek trade liberaliza-
tion, or at worst they hope to stave off slippage in their position vis-à-vis 
major emerging countries like China and India. For example, accounting for 
over eleven percent of world chemical output, the U.S. is the largest chemi-
cal producer in the world.102 In 2007, chemicals earned the U.S. more export 
revenues ($153.8 billion) than any other sector, topping agricultural goods 
($89.9 billion) and aerospace merchandise ($74.2 billion).103 Thus, in all 
sectors, their preferred result would be duty-free treatment, or as close to 
that as possible. 
Engaging in negotiations to reach agreement for low-duty or duty-
free treatment under any of the fourteen sectoral initiatives would remain 
voluntary. Notably absent from the December 2008 Text were two points 
mooted earlier (including in the Friday Night Proposal). First, there was no 
requirement that every developed and developing country would commit to 
participating in at least two initiatives aimed at duty-free treatment in a par-
ticular sector. Second, there was no provision that any developing country 
agreeing to a final deal on duty-free treatment in a particular sector would 
be rewarded with permission to increase its otherwise-applicable Swiss 
Formula Coefficient. The actual increase would be decided later, but it 
would be commensurate with the level of participation by a developing 
country in the sectoral negotiations. Presumably, the more negotiations in 
which a developing country engaged, the greater it could boost its Coeffi-
cient. 
Unsurprisingly, the December 2008 Text failed to heal the schism 
over sectoral negotiations. In February 2009, Canada mooted a proposal to 
abandon the horizontal methodology for these talks, whereby the same for-
mula—getting zero or near-zero duty treatment in all fourteen sectors, thus 
going well beyond the Swiss Formula cuts on industrial product tariffs—
would be used in every sector.104 Canada, with the backing of the EU, Hong 
Kong, Korea, Norway, Oman, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, 
UAE, and U.S., called for a “vertical” approach. Under it, each sectoral deal 
would be negotiated as a sui generis arrangement. The end result might be 
different levels of participation among WTO Members, and different levels 
of ambition in terms of trade liberalization, in each sector. The vertical 
strategy, Canada hoped, would placate the resistance of China and India to a 
one-size-fits-all approach to the fourteen sectors. While it might achieve 
that goal, it would do so only at the expense of two broader Doha Round 
  
102 See Pruzin, Sectoral for Chemicals, supra note 47. 
103 See id. 
104 See Daniel Pruzin, Proponents to Try New NAMA Approach Aimed at Winning Support 
for Sectorals, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 236 (Feb. 19, 2009). 
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aims: trade liberalization and simplicity. Free trade in certain sectors would 
be compromised, and specialty sectoral deals would be legally complex. 
In April 2009, Canada announced that it was unilaterally disman-
tling all of its tariffs on manufacturing inputs and machinery.105 Canada (as 
of 2007) maintained an overall average MFN tariff rate of 6.5 percent, gave 
duty-free treatment to about fifty-three percent of all imports, and had an 
average MFN tariff on industrial goods of 3.8 percent.106 Canada was keen-
ly self-interested in making its industrial producers more competitive glob-
ally by lowering the costs of imported components and machine tools they 
use. But, its April 2009 move to become a tariff-free zone on inputs and 
machinery highlighted the importance Canada placed on a sectoral agree-
ment covering these goods, which it championed. The move also under-
scored Canada’s frustration with the lack of progress in the Round: if a mul-
tilateral solution was not in the offing, then why not follow the precepts of 
David Ricardo and knock down trade barriers unilaterally? Accordingly, 
Canada reduced the duties on 214 tariff lines from a simple average tariff of 
5.2 percent to zero (effective January 28, 2009), and got rid of the MFN 
applied rates on an additional 1,541 items (effective for most of them, with 
an average import duty of 7.2 percent, on March 5, 2010, with some duties 
on some items phased out by January 1, 2015).107 
The Canadian moves failed to break the logjam. Thus, in October 
2010, Japan proposed a “basket” (or “product basket”) approach.108 Rather 
than take on large sectors, and mandate a single tariff cut for all tariff lines 
within a particular sector, why not divide each sector into smaller numbers 
of tariff lines? That would allow for different tariff reduction commitments 
on different lines within a single, large product sector.109 For example, elec-
tronics could be divided into consumer goods and business goods. Japan’s 
proposal had the benefit of tradition behind it: a similar approach was used 
in the Uruguay Round in the Chemical Tariff Harmonization Agreement.110 
Nevertheless, the proposal to use a basket approach in the Round was met 
with confusion. 
  
105 Canada Eliminates Tariffs on Manufacturing Inputs and Machinery, WTO (Apr. 29, 
2010), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/nama_29apr10_e.htm; see also Daniel 
Pruzin, Canada Touts Its Commitment to Global Trade Liberalization Through Tariff Cuts, 
27 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 679 (May 6, 2010). 
106 Pruzin, supra note 105. 
107 Id. 
108 See Daniel Pruzin, Recent Doha Efforts Yield Mixed Results; WTO Members Agree on 
Need to Continue, 27 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 1587 (Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Pruzin, 
Recent Doha Efforts Yield Mixed Results]. 
109 See Pruzin, U.S. Envoy Hears Positive Tone, supra note 70. 
110 Id. 
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Several WTO Members, including the U.S., found it vague. In 
March 2011, the U.S. borrowed the approach, whereby Members would 
have flexibility to make different commitments on different tariff lines un-
der a single product heading.111 With respect to a particular line, a Member 
could: 
 
(1) eliminate the tariff on that line; 
 
(2) cut tariffs to a greater extent than required by the Swiss Formula; 
or 
 
(3) exempt the line as “Sensitive” from any tariff cut. 
 
Upon examining the details of the American proposal, Brazil, Chi-
na, and India rejected it, branding it “an old proposal in new wrapping.”112 
They saw in it the same demands from the U.S. as in the fall 2010: elimina-
tion or sharp reduction of tariffs on products of export interest to the U.S., 
namely, chemicals, industrial machinery, and pharmaceuticals. 
Thus, the U.S. expected China to eliminate or cut tariffs on 1,600 
tariff lines, mostly chemical products, and for Brazil to do the same on 
1,700 chemical products. Brazil added, the U.S. was essentially demanding 
Brazil cut its tariffs to zero in the chemicals, electronics, forestry products, 
hospital equipment, and industrial machinery sectors—all of which are sen-
sitive to Brazil.113 Additionally, said Brazil, in the automobile, footwear, 
T&A, and toy sectors, the U.S. was demanding a thirty-three percent cut in 
applied tariff rates under the Swiss Formula. All told, these sectors account 
for over 3.3 million jobs in Brazil. To do what America asked would lead to 
political and social turmoil in Brazil. Likewise, China pointed out the chem-
icals, electronics, and industrial machinery sectors are sensitive, accounting 
for over forty percent of its NAMA tariff lines and over half of all its im-
ports of industrial goods.114 
Interestingly, in March 2011, China tried its hand at a sectoral bas-
ket approach.115 It proposed four baskets: 
 
(1) Developed Country Basket #1– 
  
111 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Fails to Advance Stalled Doha Talks in Latest Bilaterals with 
China, India, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 480 (Mar. 24, 2011) [Pruzin, U.S. Fails]; see also 
Pruzin, WTO Members Voice Growing Concerns, supra note 21. 
112 See Pruzin, WTO Members Voice Growing Concerns, supra note 21. 
113 See Daniel Pruzin, Doha Round Talks in Disarray as Members Divided Over Future 
Course of Negotiations, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 518 (Mar. 31, 2011). 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
File: Bhala 2 Created on:  2/23/2012 4:21:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:24:00 PM 
354 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:325 
 
 Developed countries would be obliged to cut tariffs on merchan-
dise in this basket to zero. 
 
(2) Developing Country Basket #2 – 
 
 For merchandise in this basket, developing countries would agree 
to cuts going beyond those required by the Swiss Formula. But, 
developed countries would agree on cuts going beyond that For-
mula, too, on the same tariff lines. 
 
(3) Developing Country Basket #3 – 
 
 For merchandise in this basket, developing countries would ac-
cept Swiss Formula cuts. But, developed countries would cut du-
ties on the same tariff lines to zero. 
 
(4) Developing Country Basket #4 – 
 
 Developing countries would not have to cut tariffs on merchan-
dise in this basket. 
 
The U.S. categorically rejected the Chinese proposal, declaring that 
“[i]ronically, it would significantly increase the imbalance” in manufactured 
tariffs between developed and developing countries.116 
Adding to the confusion, and possibly complicating the entire Doha 
Round negotiations, was a February 2011 proposal by Brazil for a sectoral 
agreement in agriculture.117 WTO Members would negotiate this sectoral 
not under the auspices of NAMA, but rather in their agriculture talks. What 
prompted the Brazilian proposal was frustration over the entrenched posi-
tion of the U.S., EU, and other major trading powers. They continued to 
argue they could make no more cuts to farm tariffs and subsidies, yet insist-
ed developing countries make NAMA tariff cuts beyond the requirements of 
the Swiss Formula.118 Brazil, along with China, India, and other emerging 
  
116 Id. (quoting Michael Punke, Deputy USTR and U.S. Ambassador to the WTO). 
117 See Daniel Pruzin, Brazil to Propose Sectoral Agreement for Doha Round of Farm 
Negotiations, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 253 (Feb. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Pruzin, Brazil to 
Propose Sectoral Agreement]. 
118 In February 2011, the U.S. and EU suggested they might be open to additional cuts on 
farm subsidy spending limits, beyond those called for in the December 2008 Draft Agricul-
tural Text. However, such cuts were to “water,” i.e., they would lower bound spending levels 
a bit, but not below actual spending levels, and thus not result in substantive market access 
gains for exporting countries. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, U.S., China Seen as Holding Key to 
Doha Survival as Geneva Talks Falter, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 298 (Feb. 24, 2011).  
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and developing countries, perceived this position as patently unfair. Brazil, 
therefore, opted to give rich Members a taste of their own medicine, essen-
tially saying: “if you want us to commit to sectorals on industrial products, 
then you agree to a sectoral on farm products.”119 As for which farm goods 
Brazil sought coverage under such an agreement, the likely candidates were 
its main agricultural exports: beef, fruit juice, pork, poultry, and sugar. 
Not surprisingly, then, at the end of March 2011, the U.S. declared 
the disagreements among Members on sectoral agreements could not be 
resolved.120 The Director-General agreed, stating in his April 2011 Docu-
ment: 
[T]here are fundamentally different views on the ambition provided by the 
cuts to industrial tariffs under the Swiss formula as it currently stands, on 
whether the contributions between the different numbers are proportionate 
and balanced as well as on the contribution of the sectorals. I believe we 
are confronted with a clear political gap which, as things stand, under the 
NAMA framework currently on the table, and from what I have heard in 
my consultations, is not bridgeable today.
121
 
This statement was accurate, but incomplete. True enough, the U.S. 
regarded mandatory participation in sectorals as necessary to offset the 
many limits and exceptions to the Swiss Formula, otherwise American in-
dustry would gain little from a NAMA deal. As the U.S. understandably 
pointed out, its economic studies indicated that if it accepted the entire De-
cember 2008 package and April 2011 Documents, i.e., the “deal on the ta-
ble” covering not only NAMA, but also agriculture and services, then the 
“benefit to the U.S. economy would be the equivalent of only one day’s 
worth of U.S. exports.”122 
In contrast, Brazil, China, and India understandably viewed them-
selves as developing countries with infant industries to protect. The Brazili-
an steel industry is a case in point. 
The U.S. faulted Brazil for its federal and state taxes that double or 
triple the effective actual tariff paid by importers of industrial products like 
steel. Whereas the U.S. and other developed nations impose no tariff on 
steel imports, Brazil has a twelve percent duty, on top of which it levies 
taxes and charges that cause a difference in the price of imported versus 
  
119 See Pruzin, Brazil to Propose Sectoral Agreement, supra 117. 
120 See Daniel Pruzin, As Doha Talks Falter, Efforts Get Under Way on Alternative Ap-
proaches to Salvage Gains, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 644 (Apr. 21, 2011). 
121 Pascal Lamy, Trade Negotiation Comm., Cover Note by the TNC Chair, TN/C/13 (Apr. 
21, 2011). 
122 See Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Has Not Given Up on Doha Round, Commerce Undersecre-
tary Sanchez Says, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 688 (Apr. 28, 2011). 
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domestic steel of over thirty percent.123 With that difference, small wonder 
why foreign steel producers are uncompetitive in the Brazilian market, even 
though as a major emerging market in the throes of industrialization, Brazil 
has a large demand for steel and ought to be a net importer of it. For Brazil, 
steel was precisely the kind of industry it sought to protect as an infant, and 
see it mature as part of its industrial growth. 
In emphasizing their short- and medium-term commercial interests, 
both sides forgot about how any NAMA deal would advance the needs of 
poor countries with burgeoning young Muslim populations and high unem-
ployment rates—and, in turn, their own long-term security interests. If idle 
hands are the devil’s playmate, then providing opportunities for those hands 
in those countries ought to have been the focal point of a deal. In turn, such 
opportunities would advance the national security interests of all four coun-
tries, and dozens of others, insofar as they would reduce the vulnerability of 
poor Muslims to Islamist extremism. 
In his April 2011 Report on NAMA Sectoral Negotiations, the 
NAMA Chairman tried to be as optimistic as possible. He stated that: “None 
of the seven [WTO] Members [with which he had individually consulted: 
Australia, Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, and the U.S.] totally ex-
clude[s] the possibility of sectoral participation.”124 But, he continued, 
whether they would participate in one or more sectorals would depend on 
“the specifics of the treatment and how sensitivities on specific tariff lines 
would be accommodated.”125 Moreover, while some Members sought addi-
tional market access in priority sectorals, namely, chemicals and electronics 
and electrical products, other Members identified sensitivities in exactly 
those sectors.126 Each Member had “its own vision on a product basket ap-
proach,” and the “level of detail of the sectoral product coverage . . . varied” 
among them, with “[n]o real back and forth negotiation” taking place in 
respect of the chemical sector.127 Members also failed to agree on the type 
of treatment under the sectorals, with some seeking zero-duty treatment in 
sectors like chemicals, electric and electronic products, and industrial ma-
chinery, but others insisting duty-free status in those sectors was impossible 
and arguing for a Swiss Formula Coefficient in these sectors of 4 (instead of 
  
123 See Timothy C. Brightbill, NTE Identifies Trade Barriers in More than 60 Countries, as 
Well as Some Hard Truths About the WTO’s Doha Round, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 834 
(May 19, 2011) (recounting statistics presented in the 26th annual National Trade Estimate 
on Foreign Trade Barriers). See generally RONALD KIRK, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2011 
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (2011). 
124 NAMA Report by Director-General, supra note 2, paras. 2, 6. 
125 Id. para. 6. 
126 Id. paras. 7–8. 
127 Id. para. 9–10. 
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8) for developed countries and 8 (instead of 20–22) for developing coun-
tries.128 
Thus, the Chairman’s assessment in April 2011 was blunt and 
bleak: 
But where the gap was largest was on the role of sectoral negotiations in 
achieving the overall level of ambition in the NAMA negotiations. On one 
end of the spectrum, I heard the need for sectorals to complement the out-
come of the formula tariff reductions by delivering significant additional 
market access. The objective of sectorals would be to rebalance the dispar-
ity in the contribution between developed and emerging countries and to 
achieve, if not equalisation, a harmonization of their tariffs. In other 
words, the goal of sectoral negotiations would be for emerging countries to 
“catch up” with developed members regarding the level of market open-
ing. Other Members indicated that the Swiss formula should be the main 
determinant of the overall level of ambition of the NAMA negotiations. 
Sectorals should be seen as a supplement to the tariff cuts achieved 
through the formula. In this respect, some of them reiterated the non-
mandatory nature of the sectoral participation as well as the links between 
the level of ambition in NAMA and that in Agriculture. 
As one can see from the above, there is a fundamental gap in expectations 
in sectorals. This gap is not a technical one that one could bridge through 
adjustments in the architecture of sectorals. One side considers tariff cuts 
achieved through the formula as being insufficient to meets its expecta-
tions for the level of ambition of the Doha Round on industrial tariffs. 
They argue that the formula only provides for limited cuts in applied tar-
iffs in emerging countries. They also argue that given the already low level 
of developed country industrial tariffs, and the application of the formula 
reductions with no exceptions, they would lose all leverage to obtain fu-
ture industrial tariff reductions from emerging economies. Therefore, they 
saw the Doha Round as the last opportunity towards a harmonisation of 
tariffs with emerging economies. For that, the essence of tariffs on chemi-
cals, industrial machinery and electric and electronic products should be 
eliminated. The other side considers that the formula delivers a significant 
level of ambition. These Members point at the unilateral tariff reductions 
that many developing countries have undertaken since the Uruguay Round 
and point at the value in binding them in the Doha Round. They also indi-
cate that, for the first time in the history of the multilateral trading system, 
developing countries are systematically cutting their tariffs, including 
some of their applied tariffs. As to sectorals, these Members see them as a 
means to improve the level of ambition, but according to them, such nego-
tiations must be faithful to the mandate of the Doha Round, be balanced 
and proportionate. On this last point, some Members point at the dispro-
portionate efforts that emerging countries would be undertaking when 
eliminating tariffs on chemicals, industrial machinery and electric and 
  
128 Id. para. 11. 
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electronic products, considering the current very low level of tariffs ap-
plied by developed countries. 
In sum, there are fundamentally different views on the ambition provided 
by the Swiss formula as it currently stands, on whether the contributions 
between the different members are proportionate and balanced as well as 
on what is the contribution of sectorals. I believe we are confronted with a 
clear political gap which, as things stand, under the NAMA framework 




The EU followed up this assessment with a sectorals proposal, 
which its Director for Trade, Jean-Luc Demarty, issued on April 28th.130 Its 
goal was to ensure major developed and developing countries took part in at 
least some sectorals, but in a manner that was reasonable to each of them. 
In specific, there were four key points to the April 2011 Demarty 
Proposal:131 
 
(1) Chemicals, Industrial Machinery, and Electronics Sectors: 
 
Developed countries would eliminate all of their duties on all tariff 
lines in these sectors. Developing countries would cut their tariffs on 
some products in these sectors, especially on pharmaceuticals, because 
they were covered by a sectoral agreement from the Uruguay Round. 
In these respects, the tariff reductions would be zero-for-zero by de-
veloped countries, and likewise on certain products for developing 
countries. 
 
But, on other chemical, industrial machinery, and electronic products, 
developing countries would have a zero-for-X obligation. They would 
cut tariffs on these other products according to the Swiss Formula, plus 
an additional, fixed percentage point (or points). Possibly, that addi-
tional percentage reduction could be three percent. Hypothetically, a 
developing country obligated under the Swiss Formula to cut its chem-
  
129 Id. paras. 12–14. 
130 WTO Roundup, 10 TRADE NEGOT. INSIGHTS 13 (2011), available at http://ictsd.org/ 
i/news/tni/108569/. 
131 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Criticizes WTO Chief Lamy’s Assessment of Doha Impasse, 
Says NAMA Not Only Issue, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 724 (May 5, 2011) (outlining the 
Demarty Proposal based on its effects on developed countries and its effects on developing 
countries); Daniel Pruzin, E.U. Floats Compromise Proposal to End Doha Round Stalemate 
on Industrial Tariffs, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 727 (May 5, 2011) (“The proposal . . . 
would require major developed and developing exporters to take part in so-called sectoral 
initiatives aimed at slashing tariffs on chemicals, pharmaceuticals, industrial machinery, and 
electronics/electrical goods.”). 
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ical tariffs from twenty to fifteen percent then would have to impose a 
further cut of three percent, down to a duty rate of twelve percent. The 
theory behind the additional reduction was that it would result in sig-
nificant further liberalization, but not foist on developing countries a 
zero-for-zero obligation. 
 
(2) Chemicals Sector: 
 
Developing countries would be obliged to reduce their duties on all tar-
iff lines in this sector to the amount called for the by Uruguay Round 
CTHA. But, this obligation would apply only if the CTHA level were 
below the level resulting from the Swiss Formula reduction plus the 
additional fixed percentage point reduction. 
 
Suppose a developing country already applied the CTHA duty levels? 
Then, it would have to impose a fixed percentage point cut on its 
chemical tariffs, beyond the Swiss Formula, with the result that its end 
tariffs were between the CTHA levels and zero. 
 
(3) Electronics Sectors: 
 
Developing countries would be expected, but not obliged, to eliminate 
duties on tariff lines on electronics and electrical machinery in which 




Developing countries, including Brazil, China, and India, would have 
recourse to the flexibilities outlined in the December 2008 Draft 
NAMA Text. 
 
The Demarty Proposal failed to break the deadlock over sectorals. 
While the U.S. was willing to use it as a basis for continued negotiations, 
Brazil, China, India, and other developing countries rejected it in May 
2011.132 
The sentiment among developing countries on any obligation to 
participate in sectors still was strongly negative. They saw the Demarty 
Proposal as nothing more than an abstruse repackaging of the basket ap-
proach the U.S. set out in March 2011. They were particularly irked by in-
  
132 No Consensus on EU Proposal on Duty Removal in Doha Talks, BUS. STANDARD (May 
12, 2011), http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/no-consensuseu-proposalduty-rem 
oval-in-doha-talks/134989/on (discussing countries that either opposed or fully rejected the 
sectoral proposal).  
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clusion of any zero-for-zero obligations applicable to them.133 Conversely, 
the sentiment among the U.S. and other developed countries was that devel-
oping countries not only must participate in sectorals, but also offer up 
commercially meaningful concessions, including some zero-for-zero reduc-
tions. Put simply, what rich countries demanded, namely, to go further in 
opening markets for their industrial products, poor countries rejected as 
going too far, and vice versa. 
Here, then, is another key juncture at which the strategy of deploy-
ing trade liberalization in the Doha Round to counter terrorism failed. This 
juncture, cutting industrial tariffs, is one of the oldest and most understood 
aspects of trade bargaining in the history of GATT-WTO. And yet, the 
Members could not see past their short-term interests in industrial market 
access toward a common objective of poverty alleviation and reducing vul-
nerability to Islamist extremism. 
D. Still Further Flexibilities for Members with Low Binding Coverage 
The December and July 2008 Texts closely resembled each other on 
S&D treatment for developing countries with tariff schedules containing a 
sizeable percentage of unbound tariff lines. “Sizeable” meant thirty-five 
percent, i.e., less than thirty-five percent of the non-agricultural tariff lines 
of the country have a bound MFN duty rate.134 These countries would be 
exempt entirely from the Swiss Formula, and could use a simplified method 
to cut their duty rates, namely, a two-tiered formula.135 The thrust of the 
method for them was to increase the percentage of bound tariff lines, and 
then achieve a basic cut in tariffs. They would contribute to the Doha Round 
NAMA exercise by increasing their binding coverage, and then binding 
their tariffs at an average level that does not exceed the average of post-
Uruguay Round bound tariffs for all developing countries.136 
  
133 See Daniel Pruzin, APEC Ministers Set to Bury Hopes for Doha in 2011, to Call for 
Urgent Work on Options, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 810 (May 19, 2011) (describing the 
“zero for zero” provisions as a “deal breaker”); Daniel Pruzin, Talks on Future of Doha 
Round Reveal Divergent Views on Way Forward, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 816 (May 19, 
2011) (discussing reactions to the EU sectorals proposal). 
134 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 8(a) 
(“[D]eveloping Members with a binding coverage of non-agricultural tariff lines of less than 
35 percent will be exempt from making tariff reductions . . . .”), with July 2008 Draft NAMA 
Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 8(a) (“[D]eveloping Members with a binding coverage 
of non-agricultural tariff lines of less than 35 percent will be exempt from making tariff 
reductions . . . .”). 
135 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 8(a) 
(“Each member shall bind at an average level that does not exceed 30 percent.”), with July 
2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 8(a) (“Each member shall bind at an 
average level that does not exceed 28.5 percent.”).  
136 NAMA Negotiations Guide, supra note 5.  
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Tier one covered any developing country with a binding coverage 
of non-agricultural tariff lines below fifteen percent. These countries would 
be obligated to bind seventy-five percent of their industrial tariff lines. The 
July Text had listed a range of between seventy and ninety percent of those 
lines. Tier two covered any developing country with a binding coverage at 
or above fifteen percent. They would have to bind between seventy-five 
percent of their industrial tariff lines. The July Text had identified a range of 
seventy-five to ninety percent. Thus, on both tiers, the December Text 
picked a specific figure, but one that was at or near the least ambitious of 
the possibilities in the July Text. Binding more tariff lines, and cutting the 
resultant duty rates, obviously is a more pro-free trade outcome than the 
opposite. 
As for the tariff cuts to the new bound rates, the key number was 
thirty percent. That is, a developing country with low binding coverage 
would have to bind its MFN tariffs at an average level that would not ex-
ceed thirty percent. Here, too, the December 2008 Text backed away from a 
more ambitious outcome. The July Text identified 28.5 percent as the fig-
ure. Initial bindings would take effect on January 1st of the year following 
the year in which any Doha Round agreements were implemented.137 Duties 
would have to be bound on an ad valorem basis, and any unbound non-ad 
valorem tariffs would have to be converted using the May 2005 Paris Meth-
odology.138 The initial bound rates of unbound levels would be up to each 
developing country to decide.139 After that, developing countries would 
have eleven years in which to cut their initial bindings to reach the thirty 
percent average target. They could make cuts in equal annual installments, 
commencing on January 1st of the second year after entry into force of Do-
ha Round accords.140 
E. Still Further Flexibilities for SVEs, Plus Bolivia, Fiji, and Gabon 
Flexibilities for SVEs, on top of that for RAMs, SACU and 
MERCOSUR members, identified countries, and least developed countries, 
continued to bedevil WTO negotiators. Too much flexibility undermined 
free trade. Too little flexibility imposed too severe adjustment costs on cer-
tain countries. A balanced outcome required painstaking negotiations with 
  
137 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 8(b), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 8(b).  
138 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 8(e), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 8(e).  
139 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 8(c), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 8(c). 
140 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 8(d), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 8(d). 
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each country that clamored for extra S&D treatment. SVEs, in particular, 
were defined as any WTO Member—other than a developed country—with 
a share of less than 0.1 percent of world industrial trade for the reference 
period 1999–2001 (or other period for the best available data).141 Precisely 
because of their small size and unique vulnerability to adjustment problems 
from trade liberalization, they would be exempt from Swiss Formula tariff 
cuts. Instead, this category of Members would get a custom-tailored meth-
odology to cut their barriers to trade in manufactured items. 
Concerning this S&D treatment for SVEs, the December 2008 Text 
made precious few changes to its predecessor. The December Text contin-
ued with nearly the same overall average bound tariff level on non-
agricultural products SVEs would have to reach across four bands of tariffs. 
For the top tier of tariffs (at or above fifty percent), the July Text said SVEs 
would be obliged to bind duties at an average of between twenty-eight and 
thirty-two percent, and the December Text split the difference at thirty per-
cent.142 For the middle tier of tariffs (duty rates at or above thirty percent, 
but below fifty percent), the July 2008 Text indicated SVEs would have to 
cut the overall average rate to between twenty-four and twenty-eight per-
cent.143 The December Text chose twenty-seven percent as the target.144 In 
both the July and December Texts, for the lower middle tier of duties (at or 
above twenty percent, but below thirty percent), SVEs would have to cut 
duty rates to an average of eighteen percent.145 Also in both texts, for bot-
tom-tier tariffs (duties below twenty percent), SVEs would have to apply a 
minimum, line-by-line reduction (on ninety-five percent of all lines in the 
lowest tier) of five percent.146 
The December 2008 Text, like its predecessor, singled out three 
countries—Bolivia, Fiji, and Gabon—from among the SVEs for sui generis 
treatment. Bolivia would be encouraged, but not required, to follow the tar-
iff-cutting modalities for SVEs. That meant Bolivia would be free not to cut 
tariffs on industrial imports at all.147 Fiji would be deemed to fall into the 
top tariff tier, and thus be obliged to cut its tariffs to an average of thirty 
  
141 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(a), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(a). 
142 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(a)(i), 
with July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(a)(i). 
143 July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(a)(ii). 
144 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(a)(ii). 
145 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(a)(iii), 
with July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(a)(iii). 
146 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(a)(iv), 
with July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(a)(iv). 
147 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(a), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(a). 
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percent.148 In other words, notwithstanding the fact Fiji actually would be in 
a lower tier, and thus have to cut its tariffs to a level such as twenty-seven 
percent (the second tier), or eighteen percent (the lower-middle tier), Fiji 
could keep the highest overall average permitted to SVEs. Gabon was given 
leave to engage in tariff schedule modifications under GATT Article 
XXVIII so as to hit an overall average of twenty percent.149 That figure was 
higher than the 18 percent in the July 2008 Text, meaning Gabon success-
fully pushed up the ceiling on its average level of protection. 
The initial bound rates from which to apply the tiered tariff reduc-
tion methodology would be existing bindings, or for unbound tariff lines, a 
level established by the SVE in question.150 The December and July Texts 
specified that SVEs would have to bind all of their tariff lines by January 
1st of the year following the entry into force of any Doha Round accords.151 
Here, again, Fiji received an additional flexibility. It could retain up to ten 
percent of its non-agricultural tariff lines as unbound. Finally, the two Texts 
contained the same implementation period: eleven years starting with Janu-
ary 1st on the year after entry into force of the accords.152 RAMs, however, 
that also qualified as SVEs would get a grace period for reductions to tariffs 
on product lines that were the subject of an accession commitment they 
were still implementing.153 That period would be three years following the 
date on which they fully implemented their accession commitment. In all 
instances, SVEs would have to bind tariffs on an ad valorem basis, and con-
vert non-ad valorem duties to their AVE using the May 2005 Paris Method-
ology.154 
F. Still Further Flexibilities for Least Developed Countries 
Least developed countries were not obligated to implement any tar-
iff reductions—that much was clear in both the December and July 2008 
  
148 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(a), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(a). 
149 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(a), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(a). 
150 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(c), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(c). 
151 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(b), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(b). 
152 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(d), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(d). 
153 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(e), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(e). 
154 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 13(f), with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 13(f). 
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Texts.155 These thirty-two poorest of poor countries pressed for clear assur-
ances that ninety-seven percent of products originating in their territories 
would receive duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) treatment. They continued to 
argue that clarity on this issue would help mitigate the problem of prefer-
ence erosion for them. The loss of preferences would not matter, because 
their products would be within the ninety-seven percent of goods that quali-
fied for unrestricted market access. 
Though it well should have, in light of the original purpose of the 
Round, the December 2008 Text did little to provide this assurance.156 True, 
it tightened language in the relevant provisions concerning DFQF treatment 
on ninety-seven percent of merchandise originating in least developed coun-
tries. Whether the truly important sectors—like T&A, and footwear—would 
fall within this ninety-seven percent was uncertain, despite new language 
committing developed countries to “provide meaningful[] enhanced market 
access for all” of the poorest of the poor.157 Like its predecessor, the De-
cember 2008 Text set out procedural details to implement any commitments 
to least developed countries.158 
Interestingly, following the issuance of the December 2008 Draft 
Text, the Maldives graduated from the “least developed country” status. 
Still eager to obtain flexibilities, however, the Maldives sought them as an 
SVE. The April 2011 NAMA Document confirmed their new status as 
such.159 
G. Still Further Flexibilities for RAMs 
The December 2008 Text closely resembled the July 2008 Text in 
respect of RAMs, except the new Text included more special provisions for 
RAMs.160 First, under both texts, newer RAMs would not have to make any 
tariff cuts beyond their accession commitments. To the list of newer RAMs 
(namely, Albania, Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, Moldova, Mon-
golia, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Vietnam, and Ukraine), the December 2008 
Text added Cape Verde, which acceded to the WTO on July 23, 2008.161 
  
155 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 14, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 14. 
156 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 15, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 15. 
157 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 15(b). 
158 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 16–17, 
with July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 16–17. 
159 April 2011 NAMA Document, supra note 2, para. 2(vi). 
160 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 18–20, 
with July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 18–20. 
161 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 20. 
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Second, the December Text changed the period during which older 
RAMs would be obliged to implement Swiss Formula reductions to indus-
trial product tariffs. The July Text identified a three or four year period, and 
the December Text settled upon three years—a modest concession in favor 
of faster liberalization.162 In other words, older RAMs would have three 
years beyond the standard implementation period of ten years for develop-
ing countries. Yet, “faster” is a contextual adjective. It appeared China still 
would have up to fourteen years to complete its industrial product tariff 
reductions.163 
Third, Oman, an older RAM, would not be obliged to cut any bound 
tariff below five percent.164 The special preference for Oman was an innova-
tion of the December 2008 Text. The derogation could not be justified on 
the ground Oman was a very recent RAM, so what rationalization was 
picked? It was that Oman was a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC).165 One other GCC member, Saudi Arabia, was benefiting from spe-
cial treatment as a very recent RAM, so why not give such treatment to 
Oman, too, albeit on a separate pretext? Perhaps the notion was Oman is 
poorer than the other GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the Unit-
ed Arab Emirates). Or, perhaps, the sui generis treatment for Oman provid-
ed further evidence the Round had devolved into a feeding frenzy of sover-
eign special interests. 
IV. OTHER MANUFACTURING PROVISIONS 
A. Preference Erosion and Still Further Flexibilities for Beneficiaries 
and Non-Beneficiaries 
Throughout the second half of 2008, many poor countries that had 
long relied on non-reciprocal preferences debated proposals designed to 
offset the anticipated erosion of those preferences. The basic problem re-
mained the same as it had since the Doha Round commenced in November 
2001. Preference schemes for eligible articles originating in beneficiary 
countries would not be scrapped. But, the value of the preferences would 
erode as WTO Members phase in industrial product tariff cuts under the 
Swiss Formula. Thus, exporters from poor countries that had enjoyed duty-
free access to preference-granting developed country markets would face 
  
162 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 19, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 19. 
163 FACTBOX: What’s New in the WTO Text, REUTERS (July 10, 2008), http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2008/07/10/idUSL10715600. 
164 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 7(g) (describing 
the coefficients and flexibilities for Oman). 
165 See NAMA Briefing Notes, supra note 18 (referencing Oman’s status as a GCC mem-
ber).  
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stiffer challenges from exporters in third countries that had not benefitted 
from the preferences. 
That is, in head-to-head competition on like or substitutable mer-
chandise exported to a preference-granting rich country from a poor country 
that is a preference beneficiary, and from a third country that also is poor 
but is not a beneficiary, the playing field in the market of the rich country 
would be increasingly more level. That is because the difference in market 
access to the preference-granting developed country market between (1) 
duty-free treatment for eligible merchandise from a preference beneficiary 
and (2) the MFN rate for a like or substitute product from a third country 
would be smaller. It would be even smaller because of Doha Round cuts to 
the MFN rate. 
Time was the key question for all poor countries. How fast should 
preference-granting developed countries implement tariff reductions? 
Should preference-granting developed countries apply reductions under the 
Swiss Formula to exports from poor countries not immediately, but over an 
“X” year period in equal annual installments? Put differently, what should 
“X” be, so developing or least developed countries enjoying preferences 
have time to adjust to erosion in the value of those preferences? 
The varying answers spotlighted a schism within the Third World. 
The quicker the cuts were implemented, the faster the erosion of the margin 
of preference. Fast erosion could prove a shock to preference beneficiary 
countries and their export industries. (Truly, some of those industries had 
been lulled into complacency by the preferences and could well use a 
shock.) However, fast erosion would help developing countries that had not 
received a preference in the same export sectors. Thus, the preference bene-
ficiaries lobbied for a long phase-in period, a high “X” value. Their non-
beneficiary brethren sought rapid staging of reductions, a low “X” value. 
A zero-sum game was afoot. Developing countries that had not tra-
ditionally enjoyed preferences (or at least not many preferences), such as 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, dubbed themselves “disproportionately affected 
Members.”166 How that label should be defined was both critical and un-
clear. It is used in the preference provisions of the July 2008 Draft Text. It 
covers Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which are listed in Annex 4 of that Text, and 
those two countries plus Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Nepal, which are listed 
in Annex 4 of the August 12, 2008 Report by the NAMA Chairman.167 By 
  
166 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 30 (describing dis-
proportionately affected Members and pointing to Annex 4 for a list); December 2008 Draft 
NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, Annex 4 (listing Pakistan and Sri Lanka among the 
disproportionately affected Members).  
167 July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, Annex 4; Don Stephenson, 
Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, 
JOB(08)/96 (Aug. 12, 2008).  
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December 2008, Vietnam sought to be included on the list.168 Ought there to 
be some quantitative benchmark to define “disproportionate effect”? Or, 
could third countries simply lay claim to being thusly affected? If exports 
from a third country of a product like, or directly competitive with, that of 
the preferred product register an acute increase, then should the jump dis-
qualify the third country from being “disproportionately affected”? 
These definitional problems aside, Pakistan and Sri Lanka pointed 
out they export products in the same tariff lines to countries that grant pref-
erences (e.g., to the U.S. or EU) to other poor countries (e.g., Lesotho or 
Mauritius).169 But, they lose out to the other poor countries by not getting 
the preference on those products. Those products were T&A items, such as 
brassieres, shirts, sweaters, and trousers. Pakistan and Sri Lanka were eager 
to see preference-granting developed countries apply as soon as possible 
any Doha Round tariff cuts to these products. 
Accordingly, Pakistan and Sri Lanka sought a five-year grace peri-
od, during which time preference-granting developed countries would phase 
in tariff reductions.170 That period was shorter than the time the developed 
countries would take to implement tariff cuts on the same products from 
preference-beneficiary countries. The July 2008 Draft Text called for a six-
year staging for Pakistani and Sri Lankan merchandise identified in Annex 
4, and a nine-year staging for preference beneficiaries on products subject to 
a preference.171 Yet, six years was not fast enough for Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka. 
Under their hoped-for outcome, during the five-year period, Paki-
stani and Sri Lankan exports would enjoy progressively lower MFN duties 
in preference-granting developed countries, closing the gap with the duty-
free treatment enjoyed by preference beneficiaries. After the five-year peri-
od, developed countries would apply the final, reduced post-Doha Round 
MFN rate to Pakistani and Sri Lankan exports, thereby narrowing to the 
smallest agreed-upon amount the gap vis-à-vis duty-free preferential treat-
ment. In years six to nine, exports from preference beneficiaries still would 
get a margin of preference, but one that diminished yearly as the gap shrank 
between duty-free treatment (the preference) and the MFN rate as cut by the 
Swiss Formula. After full implementation of tariff cuts by preference-
  
168 See Pruzin, Chair Admits Deadlock, supra note 91 (mentioning Vietnam as one of four 
countries at the time seeking tariff preferences).  
169 Id. (stating that special preferences could disproportionately affect Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka). 
170 See Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the World Trade Org., Pakistan and NAMA, para. 
B.3, available at http://www.wto-pakistan.org/documents/nama/PakistanandNAMA.pdf 
(stating that Pakistan would accept an implementation period of less than five years, but 
prefers a period between two and three years).  
171 July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 28, 30. 
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granting developed countries, i.e., after nine years, the playing field in de-
veloped country markets would be as level as possible assuming the contin-
ued existence of preferences. 
The proposal backed by the likes of Pakistan and Sri Lanka to bene-
fit non-preference beneficiaries was called “back loading.”172 To effect back 
loading, a waiver from the basic MFN obligation of GATT Article I:1 for 
the grace period would be awarded to the preference-granting developed 
countries. They would need it. During the special period for Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and their cohorts, the developed countries would be imposing on like 
products a duty rate different from that they applied to preference benefi-
ciary countries. In effect, at least during the 5-year period, the preference 
granting developed countries would have three tariff regimes:173 
 
(1) the generally applicable MFN rate, which would be subject to 
normally-staged Swiss Formula cuts; 
 
(2) the duty free or low-preferential rate for goods from beneficiaries; 
and 
 
(3) the special rate for Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and other non-preference 
beneficiary poor countries, which would be the MFN rate subject 
to accelerated Swiss Formula reductions. 
 
This prospect smacked of old-fashioned colonialist divide and rule policies, 
dressed up in neo-colonialist complexity with a veneer of rhetoric from rich 
countries that they are trying to help, but cannot please, all poor countries. 
In terms of textual changes to help forge a consensus, the December 
2008 Text was a disappointment. Except for two references to the Annex 
related to the provisions on non-reciprocal preferences (Annex 4), the new 
Text was a verbatim repetition of its predecessor.174 The same deal on the 
table for six months remained on the table. In particular, the implementation 
periods to reduce bound MFN tariffs on product lines that are the subject of 
non-reciprocal preferences and thereby of vital export interest to developing 
countries would be nine years.175 This period would be tacked onto a two-
year grace period starting with the conclusion of the Round, i.e., cuts would 
  
172 See December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 30; July 2008 
Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 30. 
173 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 28–30, 
with July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 28–30. 
174 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 28–30, 
with July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 28–30. 
175 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 28, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 28. 
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begin on January 1st in the second year following the entry into force of any 
Doha Round agreements.176 Thus, the proposal adduced lesser ambition, 
from the perspective of free trade. Under the new Text, the U.S. and EU 
would have eleven years (the two-year grace period plus nine years of im-
plementation) to phase in tariff cuts on industrial products subject to prefer-
ences.177 
As in the past, the major trading powers identified (in Annexes 2 
and 3, respectively, for the EU and U.S.) the relevant tariff lines on which 
they would cut duties across a dilated period. The EU listed forty affected 
tariff lines (up from twenty-three lines under an earlier text), embracing not 
only T&A goods, but also fisheries and steel products. African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific countries are the beneficiaries of the EU preferences on these 
items. For the U.S., there were twenty-five affected tariff lines (up from 
sixteen lines the U.S. identified in association with an earlier draft NAMA 
modalities text), all of which were T&A products given special treatment 
under AGOA, or a free trade agreement (FTA) such as the CAFTA–DR.178 
Obviously, the stated goal of a lengthy phased tariff reduction was 
to assist beneficiaries of preferences. But what about the detrimental impact 
on industrial goods exporters in non-beneficiary poor countries? Along with 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Nepal voiced their 
concerns. For them, and presumably other “disproportionately affected 
members,” developed countries would implement their Swiss Formula tariff 
cuts in six years, through six equal annual rate reductions.179 The developed 
countries would commence these reductions on January 1st of the year after 
the entry into force of any Doha Round agreement. Given the two-year 
grace period, that meant a difference in reduction of eleven versus seven 
years.180 The April 2011 NAMA Document records this argument, from the 
  
176 December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 28. 
177 Id. Of course, the two-year grace period would be an outer limit, based on the assump-
tion that the entry into force occurred on January 2nd of a particular year. For example, if the 
entry into force were January 2, 2010, then developed countries would begin on January 1, 
2012 to apply the Swiss Formula to reduce tariffs on products that are the subject of non-
reciprocal preferences. 
178 See Pruzin, Chair Admits Deadlock, supra note 91; Daniel Pruzin, Allgeier Hits Out at 
Chinese Demand for Tariff Compensation at NAMA Talks, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1094 
(July 24, 2008). 
179 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 30, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 30. 
180 Here, the one-year period would be an outer limit, based on the assumption that the 
entry into force occurred on January 2nd of a particular year. For example, if the entry into 
force were January 2, 2010, then developed countries would begin on January 1, 2011 to 
apply the Swiss Formula to reduce tariffs on products that are the subject of non-reciprocal 
preferences. This year, plus the six-year phase in period, sums to seven years, and is four 
years faster than the eleven-year implementation period relevant to exports from preference 
beneficiary countries. 
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likes of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, again: they continue to be concerned 
“about either what they consider the limited number or value of the tariff 
lines allotted to them.”181 
Notably, a host of larger developing countries, such as China, India, 
and Argentina, continued to castigate proposals on non-reciprocal prefer-
ences. Such proposals, they suggested in the April 2011 NAMA Document, 
might destabilize not only a deal on preference erosion, but also other parts 
of the NAMA text that are stabilized.182 The preference grantors were disin-
genuous in claiming they were trying for a kind, gentle transition period for 
the beneficiaries. What was really going on, averred China and India, was 
protracted protectionism for sensitive rust belt industries in America and 
Europe. The longer the margin of preference held in place, the longer the 
nearly moribund enterprises in those industries would be safe from competi-
tion from young, dynamic firms in non-preference beneficiaries, like China 
and India. China again demanded—and again was rebuffed—adequate 
compensation, through larger, quicker market access on other tariff lines in 
which it had an export interest. 
B. Supplementary Modalities and Elimination of Low Duties 
On an array of matters that had not been the focus of contention in 
the latter half of 2008, the December 2008 Text resembled in all material 
respects the July Text. The request-and-offer approach remained a methodo-
logical option—a “supplementary modality,” in the sometimes strange lan-
guage of Geneva—to WTO Members, as a supplement to the Swiss Formu-
la, to slash industrial tariffs.183 Further, Members were exhorted to consider 
eliminating low duties, as they are essentially nuisance tariffs, costing at 
least as much to administer as they provide in revenue.184 
C. NTBs and Capacity Building 
To enhance market access, the December 2008 Text encouraged 
Members to attack non-tariff barriers (NTBs), i.e., measures other than a 
tariff that protect a domestic industry), particularly those on products of 
export interest to developing countries.185 Two strategies, horizontal and 
vertical, were urged. Under the horizontal approach, Members would con-
  
181 April 2011 NAMA Document, supra note 2, at part 1, para. 2(vii).  
182 Id. 
183 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 21, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 21. 
184 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 22, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 22. 
185 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, paras. 23–26, 
with July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, paras. 23–26. 
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sider Ministerial Decisions that would facilitate solutions to NTBs, and deal 
with trade in re-manufactured goods, thus cutting across all industrial prod-
uct categories. Under the vertical approach, Members would consider pro-
posals cutting NTBs in specific sectors, namely, (1) chemical products and 
substances, (2) electronics, (3) electrical safety and electromagnetic compat-
ibility (EMC) of electronic goods, (4) textiles, clothing, footwear, and travel 
goods, and (5) automotive products.186 Developed Members also re-
committed themselves to enhancing trade capacity building measures in 
least developed countries, and in countries in the early stages of develop-
ment.187 
Establishing horizontal and vertical disciplines on NTBs was the 
only area in the entire Doha Round negotiations in which substantive pro-
gress was made following the publication of the December 2008 Text. The 
April 2011 NAMA Document contained, in Annexes A, B, and C, a sum-
mary of results and proposals for a deal on NTBs.188 The gist of the deal 
  
186 Labeling requirements for T&A merchandise are one example of an NTB. See Daniel 
Pruzin, Latest Doha Round Push Gets Off to Slow Start in Ag, Industrial Tariff Talks, 28 
INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 143 (Jan. 27, 2011) (“Washington in particular has been insist-
ing the emerging economies take part in sectoral negotiations for chemicals, industrial ma-
chinery, and electronics/electrical goods.”).  
187 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 27, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 27. 
188 April 2011 NAMA Document, supra note 2, para. 3. Annex A (entitled “Ministerial 
Decision on Procedures for the Facilitation of Solutions to Non-Tariff Barriers”) contains the 
horizontal mechanism. Id. Most of its 23 paragraphs and two Annexes are dedicated to con-
structing a procedure for resolving concerns or disagreements about technical barriers to 
trade informally, possibly with the assistance of a facilitator, and within the structure of 
existing WTO Committees, without having to use the formal DSU procedures, but without 
prejudice to rights and obligations under the DSU. Id. Annex B (entitled “Understanding on 
the Interpretation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with respect to the Label-
ing of Textiles, Clothing, Footwear, and Travel Goods”) sets out a draft decision on labeling 
in textiles, clothing, footwear, and travel goods. Id. Annex B, para. 4. For example, textile 
and clothing labeling requirements (as per paragraph 2:1 of Annex B) should be limited to 
country of origin, size, fiber content, and care instructions. Id. Annex B, para. 2.1. Footwear 
labeling requirements should be confined to country of origin, size, and predominant materi-
als of core parts. Id. Annex B, para. 2.2. However, Members had not resolved all relevant 
issues. For instance, with respect to textiles, clothing, and footwear, Members were not in 
agreement as to country of origin and size. Also, what limits on labeling of travel goods 
(such as fiber or composition), other than country of origin, were not agreed See id. Annex B, 
para. 2.3. Additional disciplines on labeling, if agreed, would include presumptions that 
certain rules are more trade restrictive than necessary (e.g., forbidding a label from being in 
multiple languages, requiring pre-approval of a label, prohibiting the use of brand names, 
mandating that a label be made of a certain material, or requiring a label to state that the 
product complies with applicable domestic rules). See id. Annex B, para. 6, and rules about 
notification, comment, and publication of labeling requirements, including in urgent circum-
stances involving protection of the environment, health, safety, or national security. See id. 
Annex B, paras. 7–8. An Annex to Annex B lists the products that are subject to the Under-
standing, namely, textiles, clothing and footwear in the Harmonized Commodity Description 
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was two-fold. First, WTO Members would be encouraged to refer to inter-
national standards in respect of technical barriers. Where such standards 
exist, they would be discouraged from deviating from them. Second, Mem-
bers would embrace proposals to reduce or eliminate NTBs in specific sec-
tors, such as the five mentioned above. By no means had the Members 
achieved consensus, though.189 
First, on the first facet of the proposed deal, they could not agree on 
whether international standards should be mentioned expressis verbis (in 
express terms) in the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (as, 
for example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights does with respect to various IP conventions).190 Indeed, the 
Members could not even reach consensus on whether there should be a hor-
izontal agreement on NTBs that covers all sectors, or whether there should 
be separate accords for specific sectors.191 Second, on the second facet of 
the proposed deal, there were “large divergences” among them on how to 
deal with technical barriers to trade (TBTs) affecting remanufactured 
goods.192 Third, in respect of both parts of the deal, Members had not begun 
work on drafting an agreement on conformity assessment (i.e., laboratory 
and other testing procedures), which can itself be a TBT.193 
  
and Coding System (HS) Chapters 50–65, and certain travel goods in Chapters 42 and 96. 
See id. Annex to Annex B. Annex C (entitled “Transparency”) contained language on trans-
parency issues (e.g., publication and regulatory agendas in Part 1, notice and comments in 
Parts 3–4, a repository of technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures in Part 
5, implementation in Part 6, urgent problems in Part 7, good regulatory practice in Part 10, 
and technical assistance and S&D treatment in Parts 11–12) relating to TBT. However, 
Members could not agree on several transparency-related questions, including: (1) the role, if 
any, of non-governmental stakeholders in contributing to the identification and elimination of 
TBTs, (2) the nature and scope of information a Member must provide when drafting a TBT 
measure, and (3) the rights and obligations between Members that use WTO languages and 
those that do not. See id. para. 4(iv); id. Annex C. 
189 The Chairman set forth his thoughts on a NTB package in a rather bizarre graphic in-
volving a jigsaw puzzle in Annex D (entitled “Structure of the NTB Package”) to the April 
2011 NAMA Document. The picture of a puzzle only served to underscore the complexities 
of the Doha Round NAMA talks.  See id. Annex D.  
190 See id. para. 4(v) (“Whilst the idea of further promoting the use of relevant international 
standards is welcomed, a certain number of Members are opposed to the idea that the TBT 
Agreement should mention expressis verbis standard setting bodies.”).   
191 See id. para. 5 (“Members will have to decide inter alia whether (1) there will be a 
specific horizontal decision on these issues in all sectors; or (2) only for sectors that have 
been introduced in the NTB negotiations; or (3) parallel identical provisions on these issues 
for the sectors under examination.”). 
192 Id. para. 3.  
193 See id. para. 4(vi) (stating that work on drafting conformity assessments needs to occur).  
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D. Non-Agricultural Environmental Goods 
Finally, the December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text indicates 
that all Members agreed that the WTO Committee on Trade and Environ-
ment in Special Session should work toward an understanding on the reduc-
tion, if not outright elimination, of tariffs and NTBs on non-agricultural 
environmental goods.194 The goals are laudable enough, as the April 2011 
Trade and Environment Document explained: 
Members agree that a successful outcome of the negotiations under Para-
graph 31(iii) [i.e., Paragraph 31(3) of the DDA)] should deliver a triple-
win in terms of trade, environment and development for WTO Members. 
First, the negotiations can benefit the environment by improving countries’ 
ability to obtain high quality environmental goods at low cost or by en-
hancing the ability to increase production, exports and trade in environ-
mentally beneficial products. This can directly improve the quality of life 
for citizens in all countries by providing a cleaner environment and better 
access to safe water, sanitation or clean energy. 
The liberalization of trade in environmental goods and services can be 
beneficial for development by assisting developing countries in obtaining 
the tools needed to address key environmental priorities as part of their on-
going development strategies. Finally, trade wins because these products 
become less costly and efficient producers of such technologies can find 
new markets. In addition, liberalizing trade in environmental goods will 
encourage the use of environmental technologies, which can in turn stimu-
late innovation and technology transfer.
195
 
There is even a reasonably clear link between these goals and com-
batting poverty and terrorism: enhancements in the environmental quality in 
which poor people find themselves represent tangible gains, which in turn 
may impress upon them a sense that they can benefit from trade liberaliza-
tion. Seeing such progress, they develop hope in the world trading system, 
and their hope in the world trading system can supplant vulnerability to 
extremist ideologies. Unfortunately, these goals, and the December 2008 
agreement language, are little else than a repetition of Article 31:3 of the 
DDA, which called for negotiations on environmental goods and services. 
Likewise, the agreement in the December 2008 Text that Members 
seek greater coherence between GATT-WTO rules and multilateral agree-
ments on the environment (MEAs) simply repeats the obligation they set for 
themselves when they launched the Doha Round. After all, Article 31:1 of 
  
194 Compare December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 1, para. 31, with 
July 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 8, para. 31. 
195 Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment, Report by the Chairman 
to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/TE/20 (April 21, 2011), paras. 13–14 [hereinafter 
Report by the Chairman to the TNC]. 
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the DDA called for an examination of the relationship between those trade 
rules and MEAs,196 and Article 31:2 urged greater collaboration between the 
WTO and MEA Secretariats.197 
Certainly, a more open market for environmental goods and ser-
vices would bolster the ability of an importing country to obtain high-
quality items to help it deal with air pollution, renewable energy, waste 
management, water, and wastewater treatment.198 Developing countries 
were keenly interested in technology transfer and S&D treatment in respect 
of these goods and services. The topic took on particular poignancy as dis-
cussions about climate change continued amidst a new, more flexible ap-
proach signaled by President Barack H. Obama than had been taken by his 
predecessor. Frustrated by the lack of progress under WTO auspices on 
liberalizing trade in environmental goods and services, some American poli-
ticians and business groups advocated removal of the topic from the Doha 
Round agenda.199 They wanted fast action, namely, an FTA on “green” 
goods and services akin to the 1997 ITA. They pointed out that developing 
countries like China and India maintain the highest tariffs and NTBs to such 
goods and services, and that if these obstacles were removed, considerable 
progress could be made on reducing greenhouse gas emissions that cause 
global warming. There would be a larger volume of trade, at cheaper prices, 
in environmental goods and services, thus more firms and individuals would 
have access to them. 
But, advocates for breaking off this topic from the DDA met with 
two arguments. First, doing so would imperil further the Round. Having 
removed the promising topics, what would be left in the Round would be 
the hardest issues. Second, doing so would help American businesses, 
which have an international competitive advantage in goods like wind tur-
bines, smart meters used to make electricity grids more efficient, and re-
placement parts for extant power plants. In other words, dominant multina-
tional companies like General Electric were motivated by market access that 
  
196 MARKUS KNIGGE, REPORT ON TRADE AND MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS 4 (2005), available at http://ecologic.eu/download/projekte/1800-1849/1800/3 
_1800_cate_meas.pdf. 
197 Id. at 7.  
198 Briefing Notes: Trade and Environment, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dda_e/status_e/envir_e.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). These Notes were posted in connec-
tion with the Seventh Ministerial Conference held in Geneva from November 30–December 
2, 2009. 
199 See Amy Tsui, Environmental Goods, Services Agreement Critical to Green Exports, 
DOC Official Says, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1382 (Oct. 15, 2009) (discussing General 
Electric and others’ favorable stance on removing tariff and non-tariff barriers on environ-
mental goods and services); Doug Palmer, Remove Environmental Goods Talks from Doha: 
U.S. Groups, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/04/us-usa-
trade-environment-idUSTRE5725Z520090804.  
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would benefit them, particularly because they feared a loss of their competi-
tive advantage.200 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the WTO Secretariat announcement in 
January 2011 that Members were ready “to move forward on environmental 
negotiations” was more bluster than substance.201 The Members were pre-
pared to discuss the three aforementioned issues: 
 
(1) relationship between GATT–WTO rules and MEAs; 
 
(2) cooperation among Secretariats of relevant international organiza-
tions, including the WTO and MEA entities; and 
 
(3) trade liberalization, i.e., the elimination of tariffs and NTBs, in 
environmental goods and services. 
 
But, all they did was identify options. They laid out no clear road 
map for a consensus. 
The first topic involved issues such as national coordination, tech-
nical assistance, capacity building, and special trade obligations (STOs) set 
out in MEAs. In connection with the second topic, the EU asserted that 
MEAs already at work in the WTO should be given official status in the 
WTO as observers. On the third topic, Members could not agree on how to 
define an “environmental good.” They talked about tariff cuts on roughly 
400 products, in categories such as air pollution control, environmental 
technologies (including carbon capture and control), renewable energy, 
waste management, and water treatment. But, should “environmental 
goods” be defined by using the approach of a list, a project, or the classic 
GATT request-offer? What about technical assistance and capacity building 
to facilitate the acquisition of environmental technologies by poor countries, 
and S&D treatment for them? Liberalizing trade in environmental services 
hardly was simpler than goods. It, too, involved the same kinds of issues. 
Despite its rhetoric to the contrary, the April 2011 Trade and Envi-
ronment Document showed WTO Members had little substantive progress 
on these three issues since the issuance of the December 2008 NAMA Text. 
Indeed, as to the first two issues, they made no progress at all. The Docu-
ment contained an Annex (namely, Annex I), with an introductory comment 
  
200 As of October 2009, among the 30 leading companies in international trade in environ-
mental goods and services, only 6 were American. See Tsui, supra note 199 (discussing 
General Electric’s managing director Timothy Richard’s view that the United States should 
“be negotiating an international agreement that removes tariff and nontariff barriers for envi-
ronmental goods and services.”).  
201 Members Ready to Move Forward on Environment Negotiations, WTO (Jan. 10 & 14, 
2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/envir_10jan11_e.htm.  
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and draft ministerial decision on trade and the environment. The proposed 
comment and decision were largely a summary of bland discussions among 
Members: the importance of national-level coordination of STOs in MEAs 
should be highlighted;202 information exchange is important;203 a textual 
formulation to facilitate appropriate observer status had yet to be agreed;204 
an outcome on technical assistance and capacity-building is needed;205 and 
perhaps a non-mandatory approach to the relationship between WTO rules 
and STOs in MEAs, in the context of dispute settlement, might be appropri-
ate.206 On these and related topics, the Members had not taken the key step 
of making choices. 
On the third issue, as to the definition of an “environmental good,” 
the April 2011 contained an Annex (specifically, Annexes II.A and II.B) 
that did nothing more than compile all merchandise, at the HS six-digit lev-
el, which various Members proposed should qualify as such a good.207 By 
its own admission, the compilation was a “work in progress” and a mere 
“starting point for discussion . . . towards a credible core list of environ-
mental goods . . . .”208 Annex II covered six broad product categories: 
 
(1) Air pollution control. 
 
(2) Carbon capture and storage. 
 
(3) Environmental technologies. 
 
(4) Renewable energy. 
 
  
202 See Report by the Chairman to the TNC, supra note 195, Annex 1 (“Substantially all 
Members agree that an outcome should highlight the importance of coordination at the na-
tional level in the negotiation and implementation of STOs . . . .”); id. Annex I, pmbl., para. 1 
(encouraging members to coordinate domestically and internationally when negotiating or 
implementing WTO rules).  
203 See id. at Annex I (discussing a need for coordination and the basic elements for infor-
mation exchange for inclusion in a final outcome); id. pmbl., paras. 1–2, 5(a)–(b) (discussing 
coordination and facilitating information exchange). 
204 See id. Annex I (stating that Members have not agreed to a textual formulation that can 
facilitate appropriate MEA observer status); id. pmbl., paras. 2–4 (stating that the document 
is not in final form and is not an agreed text). 
205 See id. Annex I, para. 5(c)–(d) (discussing groups that would enhance existing technical 
assistance mechanisms for least-developed countries). 
206 See id. Annex I; id. pmbl., para. 5(e). 
207 See Report by the Chairman to the TNC, supra note 195, Annex II.A (providing a refer-
ence universe of environmental goods); id. Annex II.B (sample core list of environmental 
goods by official HS 2002 descriptions).  
208 Id. Annex II.A, para. 1; id. Annex II.B, para. 1. 
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Thus, by no means did the Members reach consensus on the pro-
posals. In WTO-speak, the compilation was a “reference universe.”209 That 
“universe” did not expand to environmental services, which the Members—
despite the DDA negotiating mandate—seemed to have all but forgotten. 
Indeed, the Introductory Comment to Annex II shows how far apart 
the Members were after a decade of negotiations: 
According to a submission presented [by Mexico and Chile on March 11, 
2011] during the recent intensification of negotiations, there would be two 
lists, one for developed and one for developing country Members with 
both being self-selected from the reference universe and subject to an 
agreed alpha minimum number of tariff lines for developed country Mem-
bers and a beta minimum number of tariff lines for developing country 
Members, with alpha being greater in number than beta. 
The idea of developing two lists had been put forward by two proposals in 
the past. In one of these proposals [from the U.S., in July 2003], there 
would be a core list of environment products that could deliver an ambi-
tious and significant outcome. In addition, there will be a complementary 
list on which consensus could not be reached from which Members would 
have to self-select a certain x per cent of tariff lines. 
According to another proposal [from China, in July 2004], there would be 
a common list for all Members, which comprises specific product lines that 
constitute environmental goods. The second list would be a development 
list which could comprise products selected from the common list by de-
veloping countries for exemption or a lower level of tariff treatment 
In an effort to combine the various elements of all proposals on the table, 
the hybrid approach includes the following components: (i) an agreed core 
list which would comprise a targeted set of environmental goods on which 
all Members would take commitments; (ii) a complementary self-selected 
list: developed countries would individually select a number of environ-
mental products for tariff elimination and developing countries are encour-
aged to participate; (iii) as a complement to the common core list and 
complementary lists, products would be identified through a request/offer 
process, the outcome of which would be multilateralized in accordance 
with the MFN principle; and (iv) environmental projects could be used to 
identify lines for inclusion in the common core list, the complementary 
  
209 Id. paras. 7–9; id. Annex II, para. 2.  
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self-selected list or the request-offer list or by unilateral liberalization if 
used in environmental projects.
210
 
Worse yet, the Members failed to agree on a methodology to discipline, and 
on the disciplines for, tariffs on the goods in this universe. 
Some WTO Members (such as Argentina and Brazil) called for ap-
plication of the old-fashioned request-offer approach, whereby an interested 
country would seek a tariff concession on a good it deemed “environmen-
tal” with an importing country.211 Trade liberalization, as well as the identi-
fication of what articles qualified as “environmental, then would occur only 
on a product-by-product basis. Other Members sought a more ambitious 
approach, calling for a reduction of tariffs to zero. Still other Members ad-
vocated a zero-for-X strategy, i.e., duty-free treatment on some environmen-
tal goods in exchange for a certain minimum cut of X on other goods. And, 
there were Members who proposed a formula that would cut tariffs by fifty 
percent quickly, followed by an eventual elimination of all tariffs.212 
Regrettably, the Members could not reach even a “standstill agree-
ment.” In July 2011, the U.S. proposed all Members pledge to freeze their 
applied duty rates on 155 “green” tariff lines.213 Brazil and India balked at 
the proposal, arguing they and other developing countries would be most 
affected. Why? Because developed countries already apply tariff rates up at 
their bound levels. Hence, while rich countries cannot raise their green tar-
iffs anymore, poor countries would be unable to do so. In effect, their ap-
plied rates would become their de facto bound rates. Developing countries 
countered with a proposal for a standstill agreement on twenty-five green 
tariff lines. Here, the U.S. balked, arguing the number of lines was too low 
to give the proposal credibility. 
Likewise, there was no consensus among Members on reducing 
NTBs on environmental goods, nor on S&D treatment (e.g., in the form of 
flexibilities from tariff cuts) for poor countries.214 The juxtaposition of the 
lofty goals of trade liberalization in environmental goods, along with their 
link to poverty and extremism, on the one hand, and lack of progress in this 
area of the Doha Round, on the other hand, illustrates well how the Round 
betrayed its original purposes as time passed. However “environmental 
goods” may be defined, it is axiomatic that this universe is smaller than that 
of all industrial products (and for that matter, agricultural goods). To have 
  
210 Id. Annex II, paras. 4–6 (footnotes omitted). For the identification of countries associat-
ed with various proposals, see id. Annex II, nn.5–6, 9.  
211 Id. Annex II, para. 3.  
212 See Report by the Chairman to the TNC, supra note 195, para. 17. 
213 See Daniel Pruzin, Hopes Fading for WTO “Deliverables” Deal as Delegations Take 
Hard Line on LDC-Plus, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1164 (July 14, 2011). 
214 See Report by the Chairman to the TNC, supra note 195, para. 18. 
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achieved next-to-nothing in a decade in a smaller-scale universe—a decade 
in which the science of climate change advanced considerably to emphasize 
a commonality of interests among all countries—is nothing short of scan-
dalous. 
V. EXPORT TAXES 
One of the NAMA topics pitting the EU and U.S. against China, 
and indeed many developing countries led by Argentina, is export taxes. 
While the American Constitution bars such levies, many relatively poorer 
countries apply them, including not only China and Argentina, but also In-
dia and Ukraine. Non-WTO Members, principally Russia (which has export 
taxes on 450 products, many of which are primary inputs to make steel), 
also impose these measures.215 
Developed countries complain that taxing exports unfairly con-
stricts the global supply of important raw materials and inputs. That con-
striction drives up the prices of these raw materials and inputs, and thus 
ultimately the cost of finished manufactured products made in their coun-
tries. As an example, the export price (in September 2008) from China of 
coking coal, which is an input into steel, is $680–$730 per metric ton.216 
But, because of a forty percent export tax on coke, the Chinese domestic 
price of this input is just $395 per metric ton.217 Conversely, Argentina and 
the developing countries insist export taxes are not covered by the DDA 
mandate. Moreover, they aver that such taxes are necessary to assure their 
industries of a steady, low-cost source of raw materials and inputs. Of 
course, that low cost, such as the difference in the Chinese export and do-
mestic coke prices, is precisely what the EU and U.S. say is an unfair com-
petitive advantage for Chinese producers of finished goods like steel. 
Until 2006, the EU position in the Doha Round was that export tax-
es should be banned.218 In that year, it softened its approach, saying Mem-
bers should agree to maximum permissible export tax rates.219 Since then, 
and particularly with the global economic crisis, the EU observed that the 
number and range of export tax measures has proliferated among supplier 
countries of key raw materials and inputs.220 On some taxed items, there 
was even a global shortage, yet a surfeit in the domestic taxing country. The 
  
215 Daniel Pruzin, EU, in New Turnaround on NAMA Issue of Export Taxes, Insists Pro-
posal Still in Play, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 308 (Mar. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, EU, 
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EU suggested in July 2008 that it might drop its proposal, if consensus was 
reached on NAMA modalities—a condition that was not fulfilled.221 Thus, 
the EU was thoroughly displeased by the deletion in the December 2008 
NAMA Text of its modified proposal. Predictably, China, India, Argentina, 
and other Members stayed on the side of the line they had drawn, insisting 
the EU drop its proposal. 
VI. DITHERING ON SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
A. Goal 
Doha Round services negotiations actually predate the Round. They 
were part of the built-in agenda left from the Uruguay Round, and they took 
place in the 1990s and 2000.222 At the November 2001 Doha Ministerial 
Conference, they were incorporated into the single undertaking scheme of 
the Round. The basic goal of service talks is to improve and clarify rules 
and regulations on services trade, with a view to opening services markets 
while at the same time giving poor countries flexibilities. After all, services 
account for over two-thirds of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
for over fifty percent of employment in developed countries.223 In turn, 
there is a link to fighting poverty and thereby Islamist extremism. 
Poor people typically suffer from a dearth of services. For instance, 
they lack suppliers of reliable, high-quality, and affordable educational, 
energy, health care, legal, water treatment, and waste management services. 
Indeed, the dearth of such services, which developed country denizens take 
for granted in their daily lives, is a hallmark of poverty. In turn, living with-
out them contributes to a sense of oppression, a mentality that only a privi-
leged urban elite has access to such services. Yet, such access is indispensa-
ble to economic advancement of oneself and one’s family. How, for exam-
ple, can a poor child do homework if there is no local school by day to as-
sign it, and no electricity for lighting by night to see it? 
To be sure, if such services are provided only by foreign suppliers, 
the sense of oppression can be one of neo-colonialism, i.e., that locals are 
dependent on major powers like the U.S. for their essential services. Depri-
vation of services, and attendant feelings of oppression, cannot be discount-
ed as contributory factors for disenchantment with the global economic or-
der in general, and world trading system in particular—and, in turn, to vul-
  
221 Pruzin, EU, in New Turnaround, supra note 215.  
222 Understanding the WTO: The Uruguay Round, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thew 
to_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
223 Rick Mitchell, Doha Conclusion Unlikely to Ease Barriers to Trade in Legal Services, 
28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 729 (May 5, 2011); KIRK, supra note 123. 
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nerability to radical doctrines calling for violent action against this status 
quo. 
There is no mystery as to the points to address if providing services 
to poor people is the goal during multilateral trade negotiations. There are 
four key facets to Doha Round services talks:224 
 
(1) Market access, i.e., enhancing it. 
 
(2) Domestic regulation, e.g., ensuring it is reasonable and not a protec-
tionist barrier that keeps foreign suppliers from providing relevant 
services. 
 
(3) Rules, specifically, drafting provisions for the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) on safeguards, subsidies, and government 
procurement, all of which were left over from the Uruguay Round. 
 
(4) S&D treatment, especially for least developed countries, to ensure 
they receive key services, but are not re-colonized by developed 
country service providers. 
 
Following a decade of negotiations, the sobering reality is that 
WTO Members were far away from a deal to reach that goal. As the April 
2011 Services Document put it with respect to each of the four facets: 
While Members have intensified their engagement in the negotiations as of 
January 2011, gaps remain. Limited progress has been achieved in the 
market access negotiations since July 2008. On domestic regulation, re-
cent intensification of negotiations has produced notable progress, even if 
disagreement persists on important and basic issues. On GATS rules, 
while technical work continues, there does not seem to be any convergence 
regarding the expected outcome in any of the three negotiating subjects 
(safeguards, government procurement and subsidies). On the implementa-
tion of LDC modalities, while Members support a waiver permitting pref-
erential treatment to LDCs, disagreements continue, mainly regarding the 




The collective failure to reach a services deal surely was not be-
cause of a want of impediments to services trade needing removal. 
  
224 April 2011 Services Document, supra note 3, para. 1. 
225 April 2011 Services Document, supra note 3, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
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To the contrary, stories of services trade barriers are legion.
226
 For in-
stance, in express delivery services (which of the four Modes of service 
supply may be provided via Mode III, foreign direct investment (FDI)), 
Brazil imposes a flat sixty percent levy on all merchandise shipped using 
those services and so-called “simplified customs clearance process.”
227
 As 
another example, consider India and FDI in the retailing sector. For most 
of its post-1947 Independence history, India closed its retail sector to over-
seas firms. Only in 2006 did India begin to permit FDI in retail stores, but 
restricted the opening to single-brand stores.
228
 Thus, because of Indian 
measures restricting ownership and sales, a multi-brand store like Wal-
Mart can function only as a wholesaler to small “mom-and-pop” stores. In 
Argentina, zoning rules hamper efforts of big-box stores like Wal-Mart to 
enter the country. As still another instance, trade liberalization in services 
that rely on information technology, like media and telecommunications, is 
distorted by national security and privacy claims of some governments 
(notably China in respect of the former), or outright protectionism (as is 
the case of Brazil, which imposes high mobile termination rates). 
Legal services are another example where substantial barriers exist, 
and there is a link between these barriers and FDI.229 Multinational compa-
nies typically prefer lawyers from their home country to be available to 
them in the host countries in which they operate. For instance, an American 
corporation doing business in Brazil would prefer to seek legal representa-
tion from the Brazilian office of an American firm than from a local Brazili-
an firm. But, while Brazil allows foreign law firms to open offices in its 
country, it does not allow a foreign lawyer to practice in them.230 Thus, the 
“American” law firm office in Brazil must be staffed only with Brazilian 
lawyers. (To be sure, titles like “Foreign Legal Consultant” sometimes work 
to get around these kinds of strictures.) Similarly, full admission to the bar 
of many EU countries is possible only if the lawyer is a citizen of an EU 
country.231 China forbids foreign firms from practicing Chinese law, thus 
such firms cannot hire a Chinese-qualified lawyer to give advice on local 
law.232 Moreover, China prohibits foreign lawyers from representing a client 
before the Chinese government, and even from accompanying local counsel 
  
226 See, e.g., Len Bracken, Atkinson Sees Many Barriers to Trade in Services, Explains 
Virtual Embassies Idea, 27 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1471 (Sept. 30, 2010) (chronicling the 
Indian, Argentine and information technology cases noted above).  
227 Brightbill, supra note 123. Recounting statistics presented in KIRK, supra note 123. 
228 Id. (recounting statistics presented in KIRK, supra note 123).  
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to a regulatory proceeding.233 Notably, the U.S. permits Chinese lawyers to 
appear before the Department of Commerce and International Trade Com-
mission (though such appearances are rare). 
Through such barriers, governments playing host to FDI ensure for-
eign companies hire only local firms and lawyers, i.e., they protect their 
local bars at least to some degree. In so doing, they discourage FDI. In turn, 
reduced FDI flows may mean a reduction or denial of certain services to 
poor people—if, indeed, the foreign company at issue would have catered to 
lower-income groups, or would have catalyzed competition from local 
companies to do so. 
Ideally, services negotiations would lead to the elimination of these 
barriers. They do not. Each WTO Member has the right to decide what sec-
tors to open, which to keep closed, the degree of opening (if any), and 
whether to impose limits on national treatment, restrictions on foreign own-
ership of local service providers, or other domestic regulations (such as 
qualification requirements, technical standards, and consumer health and 
safety rules). There is no legal obligation under GATS to privatize any ser-
vice, nor does GATS outlaw government or private monopolies. Thus, the 
negotiations sometimes are said to be an “à la carte approach.”234 The better 
term is “positive list:” no sector is open unless affirmatively scheduled, in 
contrast to a “negative list,” whereby all sectors are open unless affirmative-
ly stated otherwise. 
Again, ideally, service sectors commitments would cover major ar-
eas such as air courier (express delivery), education, finance, medicine, tel-
ecommunications, and transportation, across all four ways in which services 
are traded across borders, including Mode IV, the temporary migration of 
professionals.235 Developed countries are keen to obtain more market access 
in energy, express delivery, financial, and telecom services. Some develop-
ing countries are eager to see greater opportunities for their medical and 
professional service and tourism service providers, and seek liberalization 
from developed countries on Mode IV.236 
  
233 Id. 
234 See Briefing Notes: Services, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e 
/serv_e.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). These Notes were posted in connection with the 
Seventh Ministerial Conference held in Geneva from November 30–December 2, 2009.   
235 See General Agreement on Trade in Services art. 1.2(d), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 233 (1999), 
1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].   
236 Briefing Notes: Services, supra note 234. 
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B. Modalities 
Service trade liberalization negotiations occur through a request-
offer approach. A WTO Member transmits a request to another or other 
Members stating what market access opportunities it seeks. The recipient 
Member or Members then reply by presenting an initial offer. Then, the 
bargaining begins over the degree of market access that might be granted, 
and any reciprocal requests in exchange for such access. Note, then, that the 
request–offer approach may be conducted on a bilateral or plurilateral ba-
sis.237 This approach is cumbersome, and encourages clever negotiators to 
wait until the anticipated end of talks in order to extract the best possible 
deal from another or other Members. They can do so by deliberately asking 
for large concessions and offer small ones in return, and stick to such posi-
tions for a protracted period. 
Following a “signaling” or “pledging” conference on July 26, 2008, 
which focused on possible new market access offers, there was no move-
ment in services negotiations, though the Chairman of the Services Negotia-
tions, Ambassador Fernando de Mateo, held occasional informal meet-
ings.238 The conference revealed a schism in perception, if not reality. On 
the one side, the U.S. insisted major emerging markets open up more ser-
vice sectors than they had put on the negotiating table. On the other side, 
Brazil said its offer would open up 31 new sub-sectors to foreign providers 
(while asking developed countries to liberalize only a handful of sub-
sectors), China claimed to offer 11 additional sub-sectors (covering over 
100 sub-sub-sectors), and India asserted it had added 58 sub-sectors to its 
offer list.239 Members felt that any final offers on market access for services 
would have to await (1) a breakthrough in agriculture and NAMA negotia-
tions, and (2) completion of talks on commitments about domestic regula-
tion of services providers under GATS Article VI. 
In September 2010, the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, 
dubbed the request-and-offer method “medieval,” and called for use of a 
formula approach, as used in agriculture and NAMA talks.240 But, whether a 
formula methodology for services talks is better than a request-offer is un-
clear. In the farm and NAMA talks, the formula approach is plagued by the 
complexities of the formula and exceptions to it, and it is not as transparent 
as heralded. A further complicating factor in services talks is that many of 
the services traded across borders did not exist, or were early stages of de-




239 See Pruzin, Key Emerging Nations, supra note 20. 
240 Len Bracken, Lamy, Kirk Offer Views on Doha Round Negotiations at Global Services 
Summit, 27 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1470 (Sept. 30, 2010).  
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include cloud computing, social networking, and voice-over-internet-
protocol. Consequently, as the U.S. pointed out in September 2010, WTO 
Members cannot expect to conclude a services trade deal based on decade-
old data.241 
In October 2010, Australia sought to advance the service talks 
through a “clusters” approach.242 Proposed concessions could be offered and 
swapped not in individual sectors, but in related clusters. Australia proposed 
a transportation cluster embracing logistics/supply chains, which would 
cover normal and express delivery, inventory, and transit. Backing the clus-
ters approach, the U.S. called for liberalizing services trade in an infor-
mation technology cluster that included computer consulting and telecom-
munications.243 Yet, by year-end December 2010, the proposal failed to gain 
traction among the Members. 
C. Schism 
As the global economic recession deepened in late 2008 and early 
and mid-2009, many WTO Members were reluctant to liberalize their ser-
vice sectors, just as they were with respect to their agriculture and industrial 
sectors. China and India contemplated withdrawing pledges they had made 
in July 2008 to liberalize banking and asset management. Some Members 
inferred from the 1997–99 Asian financial crisis that liberalization of ser-
vices trade pursuant to GATS would render them even more vulnerable to 
banking problems.244 Supporting their argument was the non-governmental 
organization (NGO) Public Citizen.
245
 Its Global Trade Watch Section 
pointed to specific provisions in GATS that were problematic:246 
● GATS Article VI(c) and (e) prevents a Member from establishing a 
new regulation that would roll-back any previous trade-liberalizing 
commitment that Member had made, and limits the ability of the 
Member to oversee its financial services sector.
247
 
● GATS Article XVI bars a Member from restricting the size of a bank-





242 Pruzin, Recent Doha Efforts Yield Mixed Results, supra note 108.  
243 Pruzin, U.S. Envoy Hears Positive Tone, supra note 70. 
244 See Daniel Pruzin, Services Talks Turn Focus Away from Doha; WTO Members Seek 
Analyses of 20 Sectors, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 506 (Apr. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, 
Services Talks].  
245 See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/trade (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
246 See Pruzin, Services Talks, supra note 244.   
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
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● GATS Article XVI(c) and (e) forbids a Member from setting up a fire-
wall in banking and insurance firms that prevent those firms from us-
ing deposits for risky investments.
249
 
● Any domestic services regulations under GATS are subject to chal-
lenge before a WTO adjudicatory panel or the Appellate Body, which 
are required to rule against them if they are more trade restrictive than 
necessary—a determination that ultimately is subjective.
250
 
● GATS (along with the 1997 Telecommunications and Information 
Technology Agreements) restricts the ability of a Member to implement 
new licensing or qualification standards, even though addressing the 
global economic recession may require heightened standards.
251
 
However, other Members said liberalization was not a root cause of either 
the earlier Asian crisis or the contemporary global economic slump. They 
urged the correct lesson from the Asian crisis was to liberalize, but to 
strengthen domestic regulation first or simultaneously. Further, several 
Members felt the multi-billion dollar banking bailouts of American and 
European banks amounted to an unfair subsidy, hence services liberalization 
would favor those banks.252 
Not surprisingly, in February 2010, the WTO Secretariat issued a 
paper exonerating the GATS from any blame in exacerbating the world fi-
nancial meltdown that had commenced in 2008.253 Rather than services 
trade liberalization, such as granting market access and national treatment, 
the root causes of the crisis were: 
 
(1) excesses in monetary policy, 
 
(2) bubbles in real estate markets, 
 
(3) loopholes in regulation (e.g., inadequate capital and liquidity regula-






252 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Services Chair Fixes Dates for Next Round of Market Access 
Talks, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 206 (Feb. 12, 2009); Daniel Pruzin, Doha Negotiating 
Chairs Easing into New Talks in Bid to Save Round, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 145 (Jan. 
29, 2009).  
253 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Report Absolves Services Pact from Exacerbating Global Finan-
cial Crisis, 27 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 214 (Feb. 18, 2010). 
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(4) idiosyncrasies in financial services (e.g., absence of due diligence, 
excessive leverage, lowering of lending standards, relentless search 
for yields).254 
 
The Secretariat paper, however, conceded that a large exposure to 
foreign financial institutions and markets could exacerbate the transmission 
of shocks across a border, even if the shocks themselves were not caused by 
that exposure.255 
The Secretariat paper also conceded governmental responses to the 
shocks to prop up financial institutions, such as bailouts, bank debt guaran-
tees, limits on the size of financial institutions (particularly to avoid any one 
becoming “too big to fail”), and retail deposit insurance mechanisms, if 
promulgated in an uncoordinated way, can affect the evenness of the inter-
national playing field on which those institutions compete, leading to cross-
border arbitrage and affecting financial flows.256 Fortunately, the paper con-
cluded, in 2008–2009, WTO Members eschewed trade restrictions on finan-
cial services providers, such as incorporation requirements or foreign equity 
caps.257 The paper hastened to add GATS does not inhibit Members from 
taking efforts to strengthen financial regulation258—a debatable point, be-
cause its truth depends on the substantive content of those efforts in relation 
to GATS obligations. In the event of an inconsistency, a Member would 
have to invoke the prudential regulation carve out in the GATS Annex.259 
By April 2009, it was clear the schism between Members that em-
braced continued financial services liberalization and ones that were suspi-
cious of it meant the Doha Round services negotiations were “likely to re-
main in a state of hibernation for some time to come.”260 The Members re-
treated from any substantive market access talks, and asked the WTO Secre-







259 This carve out provides that notwithstanding any other provision of GATS, a WTO 
Member: 
[S]hall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for 
the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduci-
ary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and sta-
bility of the financial system. Where such measures do not conform with the provi-
sions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Mem-
ber’s commitments or obligations under the Agreement. 
GATS, Annex on Financial Services, supra note 235, para. 2(a). 
260 Pruzin, Services Talks, supra note 244. 
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tors, including audiovisual, distribution, financial, legal, and telecommuni-
cations, plus the cross-border movement of professionals. The WTO last did 
such analyses in 1999.261 
To be sure, financial services were not the only contentious sector. 
For example, in March 2011, China asked the U.S. to offer commitments in 
its services schedule that would allow the People’s Republic to launch 
American-built commercial satellites.262 The U.S. refused, perhaps out of a 
well-founded concern China would steal valuable aerospace technology. 
Notably, in November 2010, the UAE called for horizontal negotia-
tions linking services trade liberalization with freer trade in goods mar-
kets.263 It proposed to open its professional services sectors (covering ac-
countants, architects, consultants, designers, engineers, and lawyers).264 It 
would eliminate the equity limit of forty-nine percent ownership by foreign 
providers of these services in the Emirates outside of UAE free trade 
zones.265 That is, foreign providers would be able to own up to one hundred 
percent of a professional services firm located anywhere in the Emirates. 
They would not have to partner with an Emirati sponsor that holds at least a 
fifty-one percent stake in the venture and gets an annual fee. And, foreign 
providers would not be restricted to locating their firm in an Emirati free 
trade zone (e.g., Dubai Media City or Jebel Ali Free Zone) to have sole con-
trol—a major benefit, because each zone has its own requirements to quali-
fy for one hundred percent ownership, such as minimum capitalization re-
quirements, and rules on office and warehouse space, and typically has 
higher property rental rates than outside the zone.266 But, in exchange for 
this liberalization, the UAE said tariffs imposed by other countries on 
Emirati goods, particularly aluminum and petrochemical exports, would 
have to fall. 
The UAE proposal was a good one. If implemented, the proposal 
would help the Emirates build a knowledge-based economy, and boost its 
efforts to diversify exports of goods. In these respects, the proposal was 
consistent with the key original purpose of the Round: helping Muslim 
countries. Regrettably, the proposal garnered little attention from developed 
countries. 
  
261 See id. 
262 Pruzin, U.S. Fails, supra note 111. 
263 Toula Murphy, U.A.E. Open to Foreign Ownership of Companies if Import Tariffs 
Lowered, 27 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1939 (Dec. 16, 2010) (quoting Luis V. Ople, WTO 
Senior Information Officer, “It seems that the U.A.E. is making an offer to liberalize profes-
sional services in the trade in services part of the Doha Round. In return, it wants other WTO 
members to lower customs tariffs on its exports.”). 
264 Id. 
265 See id. 
266 Id. 
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D. New Obama Strategy 
The Administration of Barack H. Obama developed a new services 
negotiating strategy, which it announced in October 2009.267 The Admin-
istration sought a services trade agreement under the auspices of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. The twenty-one APEC countries then 
could take their deal to the WTO, in the hopes it might be the basis for a 
Doha Round agreement.268 In turn, ideally, a services agreement would pro-
vide robust new market access opportunities for American services export-
ers that would balance concessions the U.S., EU, and other developed coun-
tries would make on market access for imported agricultural and industrial 
goods. 
Such an agreement is critical for them. The services sector (as of 
2008) accounts for seventy percent of the average GDP and employment 
among the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (which, of course, are generally developed coun-
tries), and eighty percent of U.S. GDP.269 Additionally, the Obama Admin-
istration did not reject out-of-hand proposals from the private sector to con-
clude a services agreement outside of the Round, as through bilateral or 
plurilateral deals with the EU and Japan, even if that meant certain promi-
nent service-providing countries, like Brazil, China, and India, did not 
join.270 For the U.S., the key to a plurilateral deal in the Round would be 
inclusion not only of countries with major services markets, but also of im-
portant sectors, such as distribution and express delivery services, energy 
and environmental services, and information, communications, and technol-
ogy services.271 
E. Still No Deal, Despite Extra Time on the Built-in Agenda 
Alas, the Obama Administration strategy failed to produce a break-
through. The April 2011 Services Document spoke of the failure of WTO 
Members to reach consensus on any of the four facets of services trade ne-
  
267 See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Seeking Services Trade Agreement in APEC to Take to 
Broader WTO Membership, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1380 (Oct. 15, 2009) (“U.S. Trade 
Representative Ron Kirk said Oct. 13 that the United States is actively promoting the negoti-
ation of an agreement to liberalize trade in services among the 21 economies of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that could be brought to the World Trade 
Organization membership for its consideration.”). 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 See Gary G. Yerkey, Negotiating Services Trade Pact Outside of WTO Not Feasible, 
Lamy Says, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1415 (Oct. 22, 2009). 
271 Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Looking into Possible Side Agreements on Trade in Services to 
Help Spur WTO Talks, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1605 (Nov. 26, 2009). 
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gotiations—market access, domestic regulation, rules, or S&D treatment.272 
On market access, the best the Members could muster was a summary of the 
stalemate in market access negotiations since July 2008.273 That summary 
covered the major sectors and sub-sectors: accounting, air transport, archi-
tecture and engineering, audiovisual, computer, construction, distribution, 
energy, environmental, financial, legal, logistics, maritime transport, postal 
and courier, private education, agriculture, telecommunications, and tour-
ism.274 It also dealt with each of the four modes of supply: cross-border 
supply (I), consumption abroad (II), commercial presence (III), and tempo-
rary migration (IV).275 But, their summary made clear the Members had 
produced no deal, not even in draft form, whatsoever. 
In respect of domestic regulation, despite “intensive drafting ses-
sions” in which Members engaged, they could not produce a revision to the 
text the Chairman of the Working Party on Domestic Regulation had issued 
in March 2009 on a confidential basis.276 So, the April 2011 Services Doc-
ument bore a cover note from that Chairman, and released the previously-
secret text from 13 months earlier.277 The upshot was that: 
[T]he various paragraphs of the draft disciplines could be said to be at dif-
ferent stages of progress. There were paragraphs where agreement had 
been reached on an ad referendum [i.e., for reference and further consider-
ation for final approval] basis; paragraphs where there had been no agree-
ment but language proposals reduced to a single alternative with brackets, 
in addition to the Chair’s March 2009 text; and paragraphs where there 
was limited progress and multiple alternatives and language options re-
main. In addition, the question of whether a normative standard in the 




The best that could be said was Members agreed on an ad referendum basis 
on a few introductory points, definitions, some general provisions, transpar-
ency, certain licensing and qualification procedures and requirements 
(which must be followed to obtain authorization as a service supplier), and 
development.279 But, on each point, there was bracketed language contain-
  
272 April 2011 Services Document, supra note 3, para. 2. 
273 Id. paras. 5–6 (stating that there had been no progress since the 2010 stocktaking and 
very little, if any at all, since the July 2008 Signaling Conference). 
274 See generally id. 
275 See generally id. 
276 Id. para. 74; Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Chairman’s Progress Report: 
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Pursuant to GATS Article VI:4, para. 7, Annex I, 
S/WPDR/W/45 (Apr. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Chairman’s Progress Report]. 
277 See Chairman’s Progress Report, supra note 276, paras. 5, 15. 
278 April 2011 Services Document, supra note 3, para. 75 (emphasis added). 
279 See Chairman’s Progress Report, supra note 276, paras. 8.1, 9. 
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ing a possible alternative agreement.280 And, on some points—introductory 
ones, licensing and qualification, technical standards, and development—
there were multiple alternatives set out in bracketed language.281 
The lack of progress signified that Members could not agree on 
proposals to elaborate on GATS Article VI:4. This provision essentially 
calls for disciplines on subjective, non-transparent, burdensome, or unnec-
essary barriers to services trade, or restrictions on services supplies, which 
take the form of domestic regulations: 
With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification require-
ments and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do 
not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for 
Trade in Services shall, through appropriate bodies it may establish, de-
velop any necessary disciplines. Such disciplines shall aim to ensure that 
such requirements are, inter alia: 
(a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and 
the ability to supply the service; 
(b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the ser-
vice; 
(c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on 
the supply of the service.
282
 
Domestic services regulations that affect the freedom of services trade in-
clude definitions of “authorization” for foreign providers to supply a service 
in an importing country, “necessity” tests for allowing imports of foreign 
services and ensuring that any regulatory criteria are not “unnecessary bar-
riers to trade in services,”283 language requirements for foreign service pro-
viders, and mutual recognition agreements for foreign service providers.284 
Setting disciplines to balance the interests of freer trade in services, on the 
one hand, with appropriate quantity and quality regulation of services, on 
the other hand, was part of agenda built into GATS—in Article VI:4—
during the Uruguay Round. Consequently, Members had known of their 
obligation to deal with the matter, and to do so in a manner consistent with 
the interests of poor countries, since 15 December 1993, when negotiations 
in that Round ended. 
Despite that knowledge, it seemed that Members incompetently 
balanced the interests of freer trade and appropriate regulation on some top-
  
280 April 2011 Services Document, supra note 3, para. 74; Chairman’s Progress Report, 
supra note 276, paras. 8.2, 10.  
281 April 2011 Services Document, supra note 3, para. 74; Chairman’s Progress Report, 
supra note 276, paras. 8.3, 11.  
282 GATS, supra note 235, art. VI:4 (emphasis added). 
283 See, e.g., Chairman’s Progress Report, supra note 276, paras. 2, 4, 11bis, 12–14, 41. 
284 See id. paras. 4, 12–14. 
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ics. Consider a proposed discipline on licensing and qualification proce-
dures. They must be “as simple as possible,” and every Member must en-
sure they “do not in themselves constitute a restriction on the supply of ser-
vices.”285 These words cannot mean literally what they say. Every licensing 
or qualification procedure, even as distinct from substantive licensing and 
qualification requirements, involves some complexity for a prospective li-
censee, and every such procedure ipso facto restricts supply. At face value, 
the words invite litigation. 
On composing GATS rules for safeguards, subsidies, and govern-
ment procurement, there was no agreement among Members on the need for 
any disciplines on these topics.286 The April 2011 Services Document con-
ceded that: 
The Working Party has continued to engage in focused discussions on all 
three GATS Rules subjects: emergency safeguard measures, subsidies, and 
government procurement in services. . . . Members have constructively 
engaged and further explored the issues at stake. Nevertheless, in each of 
the three areas, the respective proponents found it difficult to convince the 
broader Membership of the need to develop disciplines beyond those cur-
rently existing under the GATS. In all three areas, the problems, if any, 
that would need to be addressed by new disciplines, have not yet been suf-
ficiently identified; neither have the benefits that would accrue from new 
or additional disciplines. As a result, discussions in the Working Party on 




In particular, on an Emergency Safeguard Mechanism, the Members could 
not agree on the definition of a “domestic industry” that might receive pro-
tection, nor had they identified disaggregated data on services trade that 
might justify protection.288 On government procurement, they had merely 
talked about the importance of government procurement in services, the 
impact of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) on in-
ternational markets, and the fact that GATS, but not GPA, commitments are 
scheduled based on Modes of supply.289 Regarding subsidies, following the 
mandate in GATS Article XV to exchange information, and a definition of 
“subsidy” proposed in 1996 for the purpose of this exchange, Members 
  
285 See id. paras. 17, 31. 
286 See April 2011 Services Document, supra note 3, paras. 80–81 (“[T]he proponents had 
found it difficult to convince the Membership of the need for new disciplines in any of the 
three areas.”). 
287 Working Party on GATS Rules, Report by the Chairperson of the Working Party on 
GATS Rules, para. 1, Annex II, S/WPGR/21 (Apr. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Report on GATS 
Rules]. 
288 See id. paras. 3–4. 
289 See id. para. 6. 
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agreed in February 2010 to submit the requisite information.290 Yet, by 
April 2011, only 44 Members had done so.291 The U.S. and Switzerland 
opined on the need to avoid export subsidies, as they distort trade in ser-
vices.292 Chile, India, and Mexico proposed a roadmap for discussions on 
services subsidies, but were met with three competing objections: no time-
lines should attach to any discussions; no negotiations with a view to disci-
plines should occur; and without more technical work, no negotiations at all 
on subsidies should take place.293 
This lack of progress was shameful. These topics, too, were part of 
the built-in agenda from the Uruguay Round. Thus, again, the Members had 
had even more time to work on them than they had on novel Doha Round 
matters. Reading the details on these topics in the April 2011 Services Doc-
ument, critics of international organizations could be forgiven for asking 
“What do they do all day, month after month, year after year?”  
As for S&D treatment, Members could not agree on whether prefer-
ences for least developed countries should be covered by a waiver restricted 
to market access measures, or a waiver that goes beyond such measures.294 
They also could not agree on whether greater clarity was needed on rules of 
origin for services and service suppliers, to identify whether they originate 
from a least developed country and, therefore, qualify for a preference. 
They could not even agree on the period in which developing countries 
would have to phase in disciplines on services trade, or on the obligations 
from which they might have an exemption: standing in the draft text were 
prominent “[X],” “[X through XX],” and “[X] [5 to 7] years” notations.295 
Here again, the failure was shameful. The link (discussed earlier) 
between services trade, on the one hand, and improving the lives of hun-
dreds of millions of poor people, on the other hand, is no secret, and little 
imagination is needed to make the follow on connection to alleviating op-
pression that breeds extremism. In other words, S&D treatment to enhance 
services exports from, and imports into, least developed countries would 
have been a positive contribution to counter-terrorism. 
  
290 See id. para. 8. 
291 Id. para. 9. 
292 Id. para.10. 
293 Id. para. 11. 
294 April 2011 Services Document, supra note 3, para. 83. 
295 Chairman’s Progress Report, supra note 276, paras. 42, 42(a)–(b) (including the sec-
tions, Chair’s March 2009 Text and Multiple Alternatives). 
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VII. IS CHINA HELPFUL? 
A. Seeking “Face” 
There is a plausible argument that “China is really a civilization 
masquerading as a nation-state.”296 International trade negotiators ought 
never to forget the long-term prospects for China, which cannot possibly be 
as rosy and glamorous as rabid Sinophiles think. They should not forget that 
the 60-year monopoly on political power held by the CCP cannot persist in 
perpetuity. But, trade negotiators must deal with the reality of China, ruled 
as it is, as a nation state. They must, and typically do, perceive the world of 
trade negotiations through the lens of realism, or realpolitik.297 Nation-states 
come to the bargaining table to advance their self-interest, as they define it. 
Regardless of the precepts of Adam Smith and David Ricardo,298 if nation-
states do not believe unconditional, unilateral trade liberalization will help 
them, then they will behave like mercantilists. 
Perhaps that is why little attention has been given to evaluating 
China’s performance in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
If most nation-states, most of the time, follow this pattern of behavior for 
the most part, then why single out China from among all the nation-states 
that are WTO Members, for scrutiny in terms of its behavior in the Round? 
Does China really matter any more than, say, Kenya? 
One answer emerges from realism itself. China boasts, at virtually 
every opportunity and to whoever will listen, that it is a major force in the 
international arena, and has become a “responsible stakeholder” in the glob-
al community.299 No longer the insular, isolated Maoist Middle Kingdom, 
  
296 See Daniel R. Fung, The Rise of China: Political and Economic Implications, 6 DEAN 
RUSK CTR.. OCCASIONAL PAPERS 39, 49 (2008) (discussing the views of famed Sinologist 
Professor Lucian Pye). 
297 See generally KENNETH A. REINERT, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: 
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 57–74 (2012) (evaluating the approaches to the 
political economy of trade through a realist lens, which promotes national strength). 
298 See Laura LaHaye, Mercantilism, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/libr 
ary/Enc/Mercantilism.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2012) (discussing Mercantilism and compar-
ing the viewpoints of Adam Smith and David Ricardo). 
299 While U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick coined this appellation in a 
speech he delivered in New York on Sept. 21, 2005. His remark was that the U.S. should 
“step up efforts to make China a responsible stakeholder in the international system.” 
Xinhua, Zoellick: ‘Stakeholder’ Concept Offers New Direction, CHINADAILY (Jan. 25, 2006), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/09usofficials/2009-05/22/content_7932826.htm. Thus, 
in the context of Doha Round talks, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao de-
clared in December 2008 that “China will continue to play a constructive and active role as a 
responsible country, and work with all sides to promote the negotiations to achieve a com-
prehensive and balanced result on the basis of existing achievements.” Foreign Ministry: 
China To “Actively” Join Doha Round, XINHUA (Dec. 4, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
english/2008-12/04/content_10456987.htm. Moreover, China’s Ambassador to the U.S., 
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China is a modern, vibrant nation symbolized by its “Coming Out Party,” 
the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games on 8 August 2008.300 Seek-
ing a “bigger seat at the table,” China puts itself in the highest echelon of 
nations, with the U.S. and EU, and at least one notch above Brazil and In-
dia.301 After all, at least before world-wide economic recession struck, the 
OECD forecast China to be the largest exporter, and the fourth largest econ-
omy, in the world by 2010.302 
China does more than demand the rest of the world accept its na-
tionalistic self-promotion. China goes so far as to lecture western leaders 
about their global economic responsibilities. China castigates them for “in-
appropriate macroeconomic policies” and an “unsustainable model of de-
velopment characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption,” 
and attacks their financial institutions for the “blind pursuit of profit” and a 
“lack of self-discipline.”303 
B. Sobering Facts 
Concomitantly, China insists on its version of reality, no matter 
what the controversy—for instance, whether China is manipulating its cur-
rency to gain an unfair competitive trade advantage.304 It admonishes dark 
  
Zhou Wenzhong, stated publicly his country’s process of reform, and policies of openness, 
will intensify amidst global economic recession, because of interdependence. China cannot 
sustain its growth if it closes itself to the world, nor can the world re-ignite its growth with-
out China. See Amy Tsui, Chinese Ambassador Says China Committed to Openness in Face 
of Economic Slowdown, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 100 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
300 Peter Walker, Beijing Olympics Open with Spectacular Ceremony, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 
2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2008/aug/08/olympics2008.china1/print (discussing 
the “Coming Out Party” for China at the 2008 Olympics). 
301 Kathleen E. McLaughlin, World Economic Forum Speakers Suggest Financial Crisis 
Causing Global Power Shift, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1253 (Sept. 17, 2009). 
302 See Richard McGregor & Raphael Minder, China to Lead Exports by 2010, Says 
OECD, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2005), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3ad8931a-2719-11da-
b6fe-00000e2511c8.html#axzz1n3iQT68r. 
303 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Gillian Tett & John Thornhill, Wen and Putin Lecture 
Western Leaders, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d0fac984-ed6e-
11dd-bd60-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1n3iQT68r (quoting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the 
January 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland). 
304 See generally Raj Bhala, Virtues, the Chinese Yuan, and the American Trade Empire, 
38 HONG KONG L. J. 183, 183–253 (May 2008) (discussing a legal and policy analysis of the 
value of the Yuan compared to the U.S. dollar); James Bacchus, What a Trade War with 
China Would Look Like, FORBES.COM (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/31 
/trade-wto-china-opinions-contributors_0202_james_bacchus.html (presenting a commentary 
on how China is manipulating its currency); Kathleen E. McLaughlin & Amy Tsui, China’s 
Central Bank Slaps Back at Geithner’s Remarks on Currency, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 
157 (Jan. 29, 2009) (arguing the possible WTO implications, procedural steps and legal 
ramifications that can be taken if the Obama Administration decides to deem China a curren-
cy manipulator). See Geoff Dyer, China Hits Back Over Renminbi Comments, FIN. TIMES 
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protectionist forces not to launch a trade war (and to clean up their fiscal 
houses), often tossing in a reminder that it holds a vast amount of American 
treasury securities. Never mind the following sobering facts:305 
 
● China’s population will peak in 2030 at 1.5 billion, and then decline 
rapidly, causing a demographic burden unprecedented in human histo-
ry, namely, an inverse pyramid in which one worker must support his 




● China has no pension or health care system.
307
 
● About sixty-five to seventy percent of the Chinese still live in rural ar-
eas, and ten million migrate to cities—legally and illegally—every 
year, suggesting it still is in the midst of a transition from a labor sur-
plus to modern industrial economy, as theorized by the Fei-Ranis mod-
el of economic development.
308
 
● China needs to achieve an eight percent growth rate to produce enough 
new jobs to maintain order.
309
  
● China needs to create twenty million new jobs every year simply to 
maintain its same level of unemployment, and indeed with the global 
economic crisis, by January 2009, twenty million internal migrant 
workers had lost their jobs because of closures or cutbacks at their fac-
tories, leading to concern about social instability.
310
 




● China accounts for only five to six percent of global imports, which is 




(Jan. 24, 2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/75d83aca-e975-11dd-9535-0000779fd2ac.ht 
ml#axzz1n3iQT68r (presenting an account of Chinese and U.S. commentary on the issue of 
China’s alleged currency manipulation). 
305 Fung, supra note 296, at 39–53. 
306 Id. at 43. 
307 Id. at 44. 
308 Fung, supra note 296, at 46. See generally RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 87–121 (2003) (providing an overview of the Fei-Ranis labor surplus mod-
el); Raj Bhala, China’s WTO Entry in Labour Surplus and Marxist Terms, in CHINA AND THE 
WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 115, 115–32 (Deborah Cass et al. 
eds., 2003) (discussing the Fei-Ranis model of economic development). 
309 See Michael Wines, China's Leader Says He Is ‘Worried’ Over U.S. Treasuries, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/business/worldbusiness/14china.html. 
310 See Kathleen E. McLaughlin, China’s Exports Down Dramatically Due to Financial 
Crisis; Government Warns of Unrest, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 254 (Feb. 19, 2009). 
311 Fung, supra note 296, at 44.  
312 Id. 
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● China contributes only five to six percent of world income and output, 
far less than the roughly one-quarter provided by the U.S.
313
 
If, at China’s behest, such facts are to be put to one side, then it is only logi-
cal to use more rigorous metrics for assessing Chinese performance in inter-
national trade negotiations than it does for Kenya. “You, China, want to be 
treated like a grown up? Then here are the standards by which grownups are 
judged.” That is the rational discourse in which to engage China. 
C. A Global Problem Solver? 
The U.S. and EU receive their fair share (maybe more) of criticism 
for taking their self-interests too seriously in the Doha Round, and in most 
other international negotiations.314 Indisputably, they are global players, and 
they are faulted for not acting as such. For China, the question ought to be 
commensurate with China’s self-proclamations: “Are you behaving in the 
Round like the global player you claim to be?”315 
Global players think globally. Translated into metrics, global play-
ers: (1) offer comprehensive solutions to complex trade problems; (2) ap-
preciate the linkages among trade problems; and (3) express flexibility to 
adapt their internal economic structures. By no means are these three met-
rics exhaustive. Rather, they are preliminary, tentative, and in need of great-
er elaboration and precision. Exhaustively explaining these metrics is a task 
for another project, but for present purposes, they offer a starting point for 
discussing whether China is thinking globally when it sits down at the WTO 
negotiating table. 
What emerges from the record of Doha Round negotiations, or at 
least from the critical Draft Agriculture and NAMA Modalities Texts of 
December 2008, and their predecessors of July, is a bottom-line answer: 
“no.” One prominent Financial Times journalist widens the context for this 
answer to include moral questions: 
The price of admission to the club of great powers is set as a foreign policy 
that looks beyond narrow definitions of national interest to the broader 
goal of global security. Great powers are expected to provide public goods 
. . . . 
  
313 Id. 
314 See generally Bhala, supra note 304; Raj Bhala, The Limits of American Generosity, 29 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 299, 299–385 (2006) (providing examples of different critiques on the 
U.S. and EU’s self-interest in the Doha Round). 
315 Antoaneta Bezlova, As U.S. Ally, China Projects Self as Global Player, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE NEWS (Sept. 28, 2001), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=87228 (discussing 
China’s intention to be regarded as a “major global player” directly following the 9/11 at-
tacks). 
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Foreign policy, in this centuries-old [Wesphalian] construct, was blind to 
values. But the idea of inviolable sovereignty has been left behind by in-
terdependence and by acceptance that some human rights transcend those 
of governments . . . . 
China does not want to challenge the existing [Westphalian] system, but it 




At least, then, it may be urged China has yet to act in the Round like the 
global player it claims to be. 
First, China has offered no comprehensive plans to deal with com-
plex trade problems. In the four key areas of Doha Round discussions—
agriculture, NAMA, services, and rules (trade remedies)—China has not put 
forth any comprehensive plan to bring the Round to a successful conclusion. 
It has, at best, episodically participated in plans to address specific issues 
drafted by a grouping with which it seeks to ally itself, such as the RAMs. 
Second, China shows neither an appreciation of, nor much curiosity 
about, the ways these four areas are connected in countries other than China 
itself. It seems satisfied in a nearly mercantilist way with its position as a 
surplus nation. It shows little interest in whether and for how long structural 
global imbalances—namely, its massive current account surplus (and that of 
Germany, Japan, and Korea) and the huge American current account defi-
cit—are sustainable, or for devising mechanisms (such as a re-vamped and 
updated version of GATT Articles XII and XVIII) for correcting the asym-
metries that impose the least adjustment costs not only on China, but also its 
trading partner.317 
Third, China has been grudgingly willing to adapt its domestic 
economy to advance the common good. Until recently, it has relied primari-
ly on exports, not on internal consumption (i.e., domestic demand), to drive 
its GDP growth.318 It has yet to do more to alleviate concerns of average 
  
316 Philip Stephens, India Faces a Choice: Is it a Big Power or Great Power?, FIN. TIMES, 
Mar. 20, 2009 (emphasis added) (criticizing India for “unflinching defense of its narrow 
interest,” as manifest (for example) in being “one of the principal obstacles to the conclusion 
of the Doha Round.”). 
317 See Martin Wolf, Global Imbalances Threaten the Survival of Liberal Trade, FIN. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008, at 13 (evaluating the global imbalances through a discussion about the 
biggest surplus and deficit countries around the world). 
318 See Daniel Dombey & Michael MacKenzie, Paulson Calls on Beijing to Bolster Value 
of Renminbi, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008, at 2; Shifting Away from Export-Led Growth, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at 12. As of June 2011, declines in the Chinese trade surplus were 
cited as evidence that China is relying less on export-orientation, and more on domestic 
consumption, for economic growth. See Sharon LaFreniere & Bettina Wassener, China’s 
Trade Surplus Decline Suggests Less Reliance on Exports, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/business/global/11yuan.html. However, those declines 
could be caused by modest appreciation in the Chinese Yuan (which makes Chinese exports 
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Chinese households that prevent them from boosting consumption expendi-
tures, namely, affordable or free education and health care. 
These three criteria suggest China is not behaving in a markedly 
different manner after seven years of WTO Membership than it did about 
four years before its accession. Consider what a Senior Fellow at the Coun-
cil of Foreign Relations observed of China in August 1997: 
If Beijing acts as the spokesman for third-world interests in Geneva, the 
WTO could be transformed from a functional body dealing with the prac-
tical commercial concerns of the world’s largest trading economies into a 
talking shop focused on the political interests of small, developing econo-
mies. 
In other international bodies China has proved to be a follower and not a 
leader. But followers can be foot-draggers. And if Beijing becomes a foot-
dragger in the WTO, it could impede U.S. and European Union efforts fur-
ther to liberalize service trade and develop international trade norms on 
worker rights, the environment and competition policy.
319
 
China’s before-and-after accession contrasts with that of the U.S. and EU 
For all their faults, these two powers have put forward comprehen-
sive plans on agriculture, NAMA, services, and rules, or at least taken a lead 
role in shaping such plans.320 Both powers have shown a deep understand-
ing of the relationship between trade liberalization in agriculture and 
NAMA, as well as the importance of maintaining the tradition of adopting 
agreements as a single-undertaking. Both powers, albeit reluctantly, com-
prehend their comparative advantages in certain agricultural and industrial 
sectors has eroded, or is lost, to parts of the developing world. They must 
reinvigorate their trade adjustment assistance regimes to cope internally 
with a changed external reality. 
Like most arguments in international trade law, the “devil is in the 
details.” China acceded to the WTO on December 11, 2001, just days after 
the November 9–13, 2001 Ministerial Conference launching the DDA.321 
Naturally, it needed time to develop the legal and technical capacity to come 
to grips with the DDA. It would be quite unfair to expect China to have 
produced a brilliant, all-encompassing Doha Round package within the first 
  
more expensive, as priced in other currencies like the U.S. dollar; thus, it is relatively less 
competitive), and increases in labor costs (which drives producer-exporters out of China to 
other locations, like Cambodia and Vietnam). 
319 Bruce Stokes, The Chinese Challenge, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at 12 (emphasis add-
ed). 
320 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 
59–140 (3rd ed. 2008) (discussing and analyzing comprehensive plans on agriculture, 
NAMA, services, and rules). 
321 China and the WTO, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_ 
e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (annotating the date that China joined the WTO). 
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few years of its accession. Consider, however, its recent performance in the 
Round. What have been the major developments in the Round, and what 
role has China played in these developments? 
To any careful observer of the Round, even this question, constrict-
ed as it is to a recent time period, is worth book-length treatment. To con-
fine the inquiry further, consider the two topics of greatest global promi-
nence—agriculture and NAMA. What developments have occurred on these 
topics in the latter half of 2008, and what role has China played in shaping 
them? In addressing this question, the threads that make up a pattern be-
come fairly clear. 
Put simply, China has not—yet, anyway—behaved like a statesman 
in the WTO. Instead, China has publicly labeled itself a developing country 
in need of, and indeed entitled to, all the S&D treatment that other poor 
countries get, or can seize under a final deal.322 In fact, identifying with the 
RAMs, China has done little else than demand extra-special S&D treatment. 
Its negotiating posture has been one of reactive self-interest. When a pro-
posal is put forward, China concentrates on what that proposal means for 
itself, as a self-styled developing country RAM. That focus is understanda-
ble for any WTO Member, including the U.S. and EU. But, when it is an 
obsession, it belies any legitimate claim to statesmanship. 
Two illustrations of the aforementioned points are China’s first two 
proposals on countervailing duty disciplines, which it put forth in December 
2009 in the context of Doha Round rules negotiations:323 
 
● Insertion of New Language in Article 11 of the WTO Agreement on Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement): 
A governmental authority in an importing country should be prohibited 
from launching a CVD investigation of a subsidy program that is not in-
cluded in the notice of initiation in the application of a petitioning domes-
tic industry. The only exception would be where a petitioner applies for an 
investigation of a new subsidy program (at least forty days before the 
scheduled date of a preliminary subsidization determination), and explains 
why it could not obtain any information about it in connection with the 
original application. In all other instances, the authority would have to is-
sue a public notice listing the alleged subsidies it is investigating, before it 
actually commences the investigation. Thereafter, any other alleged subsi-
dies would have to be the topic of a new, separate investigation. 
  
322 See Richard Dobson, U.S., China See Doha Round Completed This Year, USDA Chief 
Says, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&sid=aqr2inP7KqB4&refer=home (observing “China hoped for more focus on concerns of 
developing countries”). 
323 See Daniel Pruzin, China Seeks Tightening of WTO Rules on Notification Requirements 
in CVD Probes, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1702 (Dec. 10, 2009) (discussing China’s two 
new proposals on the Doha Round negotiations). 
File: Bhala 2 Created on: 2/23/2012 4:21:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:24:00 PM 
2011] MARKET ACCESS AND SERVICES TRADE 401 
● Additional Obligations under Article 13:1 of the SCM Agreement: 
Any invitation for consultations must identify the names and legal bases 
for alleging a subsidy program is unlawful. The request for consultations 
also must also transmit to the target country any documentary evidence in 
support of the allegations that is in possession of the investigating gov-
ernmental authority in the importing country. The request should be 
transmitted in a timely fashion. 
The first proposal is based on China’s view that foreign governments—such 
as the U.S., EU, and Canada—often investigate new allegations of subsidies 
during the course of an ongoing investigation, rather than launching a new 
case. China argues this habit ignores the requirements for consultation under 
Article 13:1 of the SCM Agreement, does not give the Chinese respondents 
and the Chinese government sufficient time to obtain information about the 
new subsidies being investigated, or to answer questionnaires from the in-
vestigating authorities about those subsidies. Thus, China seeks to confine 
the scope of a subsidy investigation to programs specifically itemized in the 
original petition. 
The second proposal stems from China’s perception that notifica-
tions for consultations typically are incomplete or inaccurate, and investi-
gating authorities routinely fail to share information with China. China feels 
it cannot adequately address the consultation requests, because the names of 
alleged subsidy programs are not highlighted, and evidence in support of the 
allegations is not disclosed. China also complains it receives requests for 
consultations just two weeks before a governmental authority in an import-
ing country launches an investigation, and the invitation is for consultations 
within one week. Consequently, China would like greater precision, disclo-
sure, and advance notice in respect of new subsidy cases against it. 
Both of these proposals are reasonable, and China is to be credited 
for making constructive suggestions. Thus, the point is not to lambast China 
for attending to its own interests any more than the U.S. or EU do. Rather, 
the point simply is China does only that. These two proposals bespeak the 
mentality behind its Doha Round proposals: no grand vision, just the de-
fense of its self-interest through suggestions on minor or mid-level technical 
points. Such proposals promise, at best, marginal improvements to a rules-
based world trading system. Full-scale reform on foundational issues, much 
less questions of justice, are beyond their scope—and apparently outside the 
vision of the CCP as revealed to the world trade community. 
D. Thinking Locally, Acting Globally? 
To be fair to China, an in vacuo examination of Doha Round nego-
tiation positions of the CCP is incomplete. The CCP forges those positions 
in the wider context of threats it perceives to its power. Indeed, it may be 
said China does not have a trade policy at all. It has an internal security pol-
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icy, the essence of which is maintaining the pre-eminent position of the 
CCP. That position is secure—ostensibly, at least—as long as the Party de-
livers impressive economic performance for average citizens, and continues 
to lift millions out of poverty. Trade, and export-oriented growth, is a subset 
in the CCP internal security calculus. 
The challenge for China is to rise above what it has been, and be-
come what it says it is—a global player. For that ascension to occur, China 
must address peacefully an even more basic internal political question: for 
how much longer is the CCP going to insist on authoritarian monopoly rule, 
and view every issue—from the “3Ts” of Taiwan, Tiananmen, and Tibet to 
Doha Round negotiations—through the prism of power?324 Consider one 
such “threat”: Tibet. 
“Silly” is not a word normally hurled at the CCP. After all, Party of-
ficials have adroitly engineered an economic transition that has produced 
impressive growth. Moreover, many senior party officials are well educated 
and well-traveled, and if not exactly cosmopolitan in their outlook, at least 
have been exposed to alternative perspectives about China and the world. 
Accordingly, criticisms of the Party focus on the costs of that growth, most 
notably in terms of social inequality (which is high) and human rights (es-
pecially religious freedom), on whether it will be followed—sooner or lat-
er—with genuine democratic development. But the censorship regime of 
China masks a deep insecurity of Party officials about any matter it per-
ceives as a threat to its monopoly on political power. 
As to Tibet, China’s censorship regime suggests the censors are 
scared to the point of silliness. The censorship regime China defended in the 
case actually includes—supposedly to protect public morality—the control 
of the reincarnation of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama (1935–present), 
leader of Tibetan Buddhism and winner of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize.325  
In 2007, the Chinese government promulgated a regulation called 
Management Rules for Reincarnation of Living Buddhas.326 This regulation 
prohibits any person living outside of China from influencing the reincarna-
tion process for the Dalai Lama. Such a person of course, would include the 
Dalai Lama, who was forced during the 1959 Tibet uprising to flee to exile 
in Dharamsala, India. As the Financial Times explains: 
  
324 See China’s Charter ’08, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 15, 2008), available at www.nybooks. 
com/articles/22210 (providing a stirring and eloquent call for non-violent reform despite 
CCP efforts at suppression of the document).  
325 Dalai Lama, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/d/_ 
dalai_lama/index.html (last updated Apr. 28, 2011) (providing background on the 13th Dalai 
Lama’s history and accomplishments). 
326 See Jamil Anderlini, Dalai Lama Divines Succession Path, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, 
at 3, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/367c28f6-4b38-11e0-b2c2-00144feab49a. 
html#axzz1eHmCFtoK.  
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The rules stipulate that reincarnations must be approved by a government 
authority above the municipal level, conjuring up images of old monks’ 
spirits hovering in limbo while they await approval from the interminable 
Chinese bureaucracy before they can be reborn.
327
 
In other words, the officially atheist Communist Party has a measure to con-
trol an unmistakably religious matter. The Party alone takes the final deci-
sion on who is reincarnated as the next Dalai Lama.328 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the reality of what the CCP spends on 
internal security is stark. As the Financial Times reported: 
China’s spending on internal security overtook national defense for the 
first time last year [2010], underlining Beijing’s growing concern about 
public unrest . . . . 
[S]pending on public security grew 15.6 percent to Rmb [Renminbi, mean-
ing “People’s money”] 549bn [billion] ($84bn) last year, compared with 
defense spending that grew 7.8 percent to Rmb533.4bn Public security 
spending was Rmb34.6bn, or 6.7 percent, over budget. 
Security spending, budgeted at Rmb624bn [or $94.9 billion, at the 15 
March 2011 exchange rate of 6.578 Rmb per dollar], is this year [2011] 
scheduled to outpace defense, at Rmb602bn., and will be more than the 
combined budgets for healthcare, diplomacy, and financial oversight. 
This reprioritization underscores Beijing’s nervousness at escalating public 
unrest. Violent riots in Xinjiang and Tibet in recent years have prompted 
more spending on public security forces, including paramilitary forces 
known as the people’s armed police. 
It comes as calls for a Middle East inspired “Jasmine revolution” have 
gone largely unanswered in China . . . . 
[T]he calls for protests in China have sent security forces into overdrive. 
Dissidents have been rounded up or placed under heightened surveillance, 
and several foreign journalists were beaten by security officers as they vis-
ited potential protest sites last Sunday . . . . 
China’s internal security apparatus has grown more powerful in recent 
years, with the rise of Zhou Yongkan, security chief, a member of the pol-
itburo standing committee. 
  
327 Id.; see also James Lamont & Jamil Anderlini, Dalai Lama to Retire from Politics, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, at 3, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/67d145ac-4ae4-11e0-
911b-00144feab49a.html#axzz1eHmCFtoK (reporting that the Dalai Lama decided to step 
down as the political leader of the Tibetan government in exile (but will remain as the spir-
itual head), which “potentially confound[s] the Chinese government’s efforts to control the 
succession process after his death,” because it will make it more difficult for the government 
to argue the temporal power of the Dalai Lama passes to his reincarnated successor whom 
the government chooses, in other words, because the decision divorces religious and political 
authority and thus makes it harder for the government to control the politics of Tibet through 
a reincarnated religious leader of the governments liking). 
328 Anderlini, supra note 326. 
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In one reminder of the scale of the internal security apparatus, official me-
dia reported that 739,000 security guards were dispatched to ensure order 
and direct traffic as China’s annual congresses began in Beijing over the 
weekend . . . . 
China’s security budget includes funding for courts, jails, police, paramili-
tary, and even internet monitoring. Analysts say spending on both public 
security and national defense is higher than reported.
329
 
Indeed, China’s internal security budget, which includes internet 
censorship, to a level higher than its military forces. That level is astound-
ing, even on a per capita basis.330 In 2010, China spent U.S. $ 62.84 to 
monitor each Chinese person.331 In 2011, it spent $70.99 to keep its citizens 
in line.332 
  
329 Leslie Hook, Nervous Beijing Raises Security Spending, Fin. Times, Mar. 6, 2011, at 5 
(emphasis added). Hours before the first planned Jasmine revolution protest, Mr. Zhou 
Yongkang, referenced above, told his colleagues in the security services to “[s]trive to defuse 
conflicts and disputes while they are embryonic.” Geoff Dyer & Kathrin Hille, China Securi-
ty Chief Exerts Growing Influence, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, at 3, available at http://www.ft. 
com/cms/s/0/4f728396-45b6-11e0-acd8-00144feab49a.html#axzz1e5OnOPs1; see also As 
Protests Spread Across the Middle East, China Keeps a Firm Hand on Protests at Home, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 24, 2011),  http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-
Pacific/2011 /0224/As-protests-spread-across-the-Middle-East-China-keeps-a-firm-hand-on-
protests-at-home; Geoff Dyer, Nervous China Puts Security Apparatus into Overdrive, FIN. 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d4fcf4e6-3f6d-11e0-a1ba-
00144feabdc0.html#ax zz1e5OnOPs1 (discussing the crackdown on the Jasmine Revolution 
and other such incidents). At the same time, there are signs of possible shifts by, or at least 
differing opinions within, the Chinese government. As Bill Emmott, former editor of The 
Economist wrote, “China has just voted [on February 26 at the United Nations Security 
Council on Resolution 1970] to refer [Libyan] Colonel Qaddafi to the ICC [International 
Criminal Court] for having acted against his opponents in pretty much the same way as it did 
in 1989 with the Tiananmen Square revolt.” David Pilling, Lying Low is No Longer an Op-
tion for Beijing, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/40ee5c2a-450a-
11e0-80e7-00144feab4 9a.html#axzz1e5OnOPs1; see also Hu Ping, China’s Paradoxical 
Vote to Sanction the Gadhafi Regime, THE EPOCH TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2 /opinion/chinas-paradoxical-un-vote-to-sanction-the-
gadhafi-regime-52329.html (discussing this vote). 
330 The Central Intelligence Agency estimates China’s population as of July 2011 at 
1,336,718,015. East and Southeast Asia: China, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia. 
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last updated Nov. 8, 2011). 
331 This result is obtained by dividing the 2010 security budget of $84 billion by the CIA 
estimate of the Chinese population as of July 2011. See Hook, supra note 329 (stating that 
China had a budget of $84 billion in public security spending in 2010); CIA WORLD 
FACTBOOK, supra note 330 (providing the Chinese population as of July 2011). As China’s 
population would have grown between 2010 and 2011, using the July 2011 figure actually 
understates the true 2010 per capita result. 
332 This result is obtained by dividing the 2011 security budget of $94.9 billion by the CIA 
estimate of the Chinese population as of July 2011. See Chris Buckley, Update 2 – China 
Internal Security Spending Jumps Past Army Budget, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www. 
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E. Can a Security State Make the Necessary Compromises? 
There is, of course, a deeper point about freedom of conscience and 
its relation to free trade.333 It could rightly be asked whether the deeper inte-
gration of China into the world trading system since its WTO accession 
over a decade ago has had a positive effect on the human rights climate in 
that country. For now, that inquiry is not the point. Rather, the question is 
whether a Member as important to the multilateral trade regime as China, 
but one governed with an unrivalled obsession about internal security to 
preserve political power, can make the compromises necessary to forge a 
grand Doha Round bargain.  
Of course, Chinese trade policy is not an immovable object under 
siege from irresistible foreign forces. Reality can change, if the political will 
exists to do so. China can lead other countries to use the WTO as a forum to 
advance the common good. Rather than expressing delight when the com-
mon good advances as a by-product, an externality, of its own self-interest, 
China can see advancement of the common good as its prime directive. In-
deed, arguably China—simply because of its size, trajectory, and aspira-
tions—has a responsibility to the international community to look at Doha 
Round negotiations in this way. In sum, opportunities for China to exhibit 
great statesmanship in the Round remain. 
  
reuters.com/article/2011/03/05/china-unrest-idUSTOE72400920110305 (stating that China 
budgeted $95 billion in public security spending for 2011); CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra 
note 330 (providing the Chinese population as of July 2011). 
333 Notably, the sovereign state with the largest number of diplomatic relations is the Vati-
can, which has them with 188 countries. The second highest number of diplomatic relations 
is enjoyed by the U.S., with 177. See John Thavis, Vatican Emerges from WikiLeaks as a 
Key Player on Global Scene, CATH. NEWS SERVICE (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.catholic 
news.com/data/stories/cns/1005234.htm. Yet, the Vatican does not officially recognize China 
(or Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia), in part because of a disagreement with China over the 
selection of Bishops and Cardinals. See Shijiazhuang, The Party Versus the Pope, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2010, at 53. As George Weigel’s monumental biography of Pope John 
Paul II shows, having encountered this issue in the former Soviet Bloc during the Cold War 
era, the Vatican is no stranger to Communist authorities claiming the right to make decisions 
about ordination of Catholic clergy. See generally GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE, THE 
BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II (1999). On this topic, and others, the Catholic Church and 
Tibetan Buddhist officials share much in common. 
